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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
I 
Diaz J oalled maker of modern Mexico came from the mountain state of 
Oaxaoa. I He studied law under Juarez, became one of the most prominent 
oitizens of his state and later fought with Ju~rez for the liberation of 
Mexico from the French Empire. Ju~rez became President of Mexico and in 
1872 was the first of Mexico's presidents to die in office. Lerdo de Tejado, 
~ justice of the Supreme Court legally suoceeded to the Presidenoy. Diaz 
plotted against him and on November 23, 1876, entered the capital in triumph. 
I 
Diaz was a strong ruler. His te~ is rememberedJ however, as the era 
when foreign eoonomy penetrated Mexioo~ During his dictatorship, foreign 
oapital oame to Mexioo, and as labor remained oheap Mexico·s natural 
resouroes were exploited. Generous conoessions were given foreigners and 
they left their influenoe on railroads, mines, oil fields, and farmland --
developing Mexico, but making use of her at the same time. Concessions and 
the manner in which they were operated aroused peoplets hostility over all 
I 
the land, but Diaz was able to keep them in subjection. 2 Workingmen were 
killed if they attempted to strike, and Indians were sold into slavery. 
-_ .. _-------... _---
1 Ernest Gruening, Mexioo ~~ Heritage, Century Co., N.Y., 1928, 559. 
2 Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History Of The United States, Henry Holt 
&: Co., N.Y., 1942, 540. --
1 
p 
2 
Anyone who protested was either imprisoned or killed. Governors and politi-
oal ohiefs robbed the Indians of their land. Carlo De Fornaro in his work 
entitled Carranza and Mexioo states that by 1892 the ownership of all large 
bodies of agricultural land had passed fran the possession of more than a 
million small farmers into less than fifty rich families and corporations of 
I 
the Diaz clique. The Indians lost their valuable land and independent 
economio life and went into peonage on the great haoiendas, in the mines and 
faotories where they could be more easily controlled by soldiers.3 Samuel 
Flagg Bemis in his book entitled A Diplomatio History ~ The United States 
I 
further concludes that during Diaz' reign there was no progress in eduoation, 
4 public welfare, sanitation or social improvement. But on the other hand, 
H. I. Priestl~ in his book, ~ Mexioan Nation, A History had this to say in 
summary: 
I Under D1az Mexico beoame the safest country 
in the world, without exoeption. It was policed 
by some three thousand rurales, a small number of 
Municipal gendarnes, and an armw of insignificant 
proportions in reserve. This peaoe was ••• 
spontaneous and natural, after the f1rst years of 
the dictatorship.5 
Madero advooated oonstitutional liberties. In his book entitled 
Presidential Succession~~, he criticized the president and urgedpeo~le 
3 Carlo De Fornaro, Carranza ~ Mexico, Mitchel Kenner1ey, N.Y., 1915, 45. 
4 Bemis, 541. 
5 Herbert Ingram Priestley, The Mexican Nation, A History, Maomillan Co., 
1960, 393. - --
jP 
3 
to insist on the right to a tair ballot and the right to ohoose a oandidate 
of their own. The demoorats were arrested, and while they were in prison, an 
I 
eleotion was held and Diaz was again triumphant. Believing that he was 
I 
safely installed again, Diaz released Madero. But Madero would not be sup-
I pressed, he issued his "Plan of San Luis Potosi" in whioh he advooated free 
suffrage, no re-eleotion, restoration of land to the Indians, and freedom for 
I 
political prisoners. His efforts were effective. On May 24, 1910, Diaz 
I 
resigned. At the last, Diaz tried to put through reforms but he was too late 
Civil war had begun May 6, 1911. The city of Ju~rez was the soene of the 
I I 
most deoisive battle of the oonfliot, and, as Juarez was oaptured, Diaz 
sailed from Mexico forever. He is written about as a great and powerful 
ruler, but he forgot the people trom whom his power came. 6 
On June 7, 1911, Madero triumphantly marohed into Mexico City. His 
government is referred to as anti-capitalistio and anti-foreign. He was an 
idealist, believing that the people owned the land but having no practioal 
method ot oarrying out his ideas. Soon opposition and disoontentment arose 
from all quarters. The upper classes of the old r'gime were against any 
improvement of the lot ot the common people. And the oommon people were 
disgruntled beoause they did not reoeive the land at onoe. Revolts ocourred. 
Before 1913, tour attempts had been made to overthrow the government. On 
February 18, 1913, Generals Blanquet and Huerta entered the National Palaoe, 
which they were supposed to defend, and arrested Madero. The men in power, 
-_ .. _-----------
6 ~., 297 .!i.!.!9.. 
p 
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I , 
Felix Diaz (nephew ot the tormer president, Portirio Diaz), Blanquet, and 
Huerta oalled oongress into extraordinary session and made Huerta Provisional 
President. This ooup d"tat was aooomplished with the aid ot the armywhioh 
I / • 
was accustomed to obeying Huerta, a general during Diaz' regl.m8. On 
February 23, 1913, Madero and vice-President Su~rez were shot. 7 
The Amerioan Ambassador to Mexioo, Henry Lane Wilson, advooated the 
recognition ot Huerta. Kiss Inez Thomas in her thesis entitled Wilson and 
Huerta commented that the American Ambassador advocated "dollar Diplomacy." 
He had been appointed by tormer President Taft who praotioed the same theory. 
The writer oontinues, "Henry Lane Wilson's brother, tormer Senator John 
Wilson, was intimate with Ballinger, who was a olose triend of the 
Guggenheims. The Guggenheims had oommeroial interest in Kexioo. The Ambas-
sador was known to be a spokesman for the oommeroial interests in Mexioo. 
He oontinually urged the reoognition of the Huerta government •••• He telt 
that an orderly government would better proteot United States interests and 
investments. ,,8 But this would seem to assume ths.t Huerta would bring order 
and tranquillity. However, the Ambassador's plans were oompletely dis-
arranged when on Maroh 4, 1913. the Tatt aaninistration retired and Woodrow 
Wilson beoame President of the United States. In his reports, the ambassador 
who was anxious to have Huerta reoognized, seemed to overestimate Huerta's 
power and minimize the nature and extent of the revolt against him whioh was 
-----_ ... _------.. 
7 J. Fred Rippy, Jose Vasoonoelos, Guy Stevens, Mexico, The University ot 
Chioago Press, Chioago, 1928, 36. 
8 Inez Thomas, Wilson And Huerta, unpublished thesis, Loyola University, 
Chicago, 1946, 36-37. 
p 
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5 
rampant in many ot the seotions ot Mexioo. The Amerioan oonsuls in the war-
ring seotions presented a ditterent picture as shown in their reports to 
washington ot the various seotional revolts. 9 The leading state in revolt 
against Huerta was Coahuila whioh was governed by Carranza who issued a 
formal Proolamation of Independence on February 19, 19l5: 
---~-----------
Proclamation ot the Independence 
ot the State ot Coahuila 
Venustiano Carranza, Constitutional 
Governor ot the tree and sovereign state ot 
Coahuila de Zaragoza, to the inhabitants 
thereot, greeting. 
Know ye that the Congrel. ot this State 
ba. deoreed as tollows& 
The XXII Constitutional Congress ot the 
tree, independent and lovereign State ot 
Coahuila de Zaragosa decreest 
Humber 1421. 
Article 1. General Victoriano Huerta 
is not reoognized in his oharaoter ot 
Chiet ot the Exeoutive Power ot the Repub-
lio, whioh he alleges to have been oon-
terred upon him by the Senate; and none 
ot his aots and orders in that oapaoity 
are reoognized. 
Artiole 2. Extraordinary powers are 
granted to the Exeoutive ot the State 
in all the branohes of the Publio AdIIlin-
istration in order that he may suppress 
a~ that he may see fit to suppress and 
in order that he may pr coeed to arm 
toroes to aid in the support of Consti-
tutional order in the Republio ••• lO 
9 Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States,Government 
PrIntIng OHioe ,-WaS1irngton, 1918, 136-~1r. -reFealEer referred to as 
For. Rela. To give the reader an example ot what is to be found in this 
oltatIon, a few ot the telegrams trom the Amerioan oonsul. are quoted on 
the three pages direotly following. These are oited by tootnotes 11 to 15 
inclusive. 
10 Ibid., 721. 
-
.. 
6 
A telegram trom the American Consul General at Monterey to the Secretary ot 
state ot the United States reads as tollows, 
American Consulate General 
Monterey. February 24, 1913 
The situation in northern Mexioo looks less 
enoouraging. Active rebel armies in the , 
States ot Coahuila, Sonora, San Luis Potosi.ll 
Hanna 
The PrO'Yisional Governor ot Sonora sent the tollolling telegram to President 
Wilson: 
San Antonio, Texas, 
February 28, 1913 
The President. I take the liberty as 
a _.ber ot tbs National Congress ot 
)lexioo to enter proteat against the 
reoognition ot the spurious government 
nowattanpting to be established 'b1 
Huerta. President Madero never resigned 
and the alleged resignation presented to 
Congress was a torgery ••• 12 
R. V. Peaqueira 
.Ambassador Wilson, however, oontinued to work untiringly tor the reoognition 
of Huerta; as is evident from. this telegrams 
.. _-------.... _--
11 Ibid., 736. 
-12 Ibid •• 749. 
••• 
The Amerioan Ambassador to the 
Seoreta~ ot State 
Amerioan !mba • .., 
Mexico. Maroh 12, 1913 
General Huerta is pre_inently a 
soldier, a man ot iron ••• who knOWlJ. 
what he wants and how to get it, and 
is not. I believe overly partioular 
as to his methods. He is a tirm be-
liver in tl}e polioy ot General 
Portirio Dlaz and believes in the 
II 
I. 
jiP 
cultivation of the oloaeat and moat 
friendly relations with the United States 
I believe ht. to be a sinoere patriot.13 
7 
I 
flro day8 later, our American Consul at Cuidad Porfirio Dial, telegraphed the 
State Department as folloDt 
Amerioan Con8ulate, 
Eagle Pasl, Maroh 14, 1913 
~ believe Governor Carranza's goal 
is the Presidency. His suooess iJl 
seouriJlg volUJlteers is _questionable J 
about 2,000 at Monolova.14 
Luther T. Ellsworth 
On Maroh 30, 1913, Carranla deolared himself proviaional p-esident of .xioo 
and on July 11th, Neleon O'Shaughnessy replaoed Henry Lane Wilson as .. bal-
sador. l5 
Upon taking office, President Wilson was faoed with the question of 
reoognition of General Huerta mo had beoame provisional president thirteen 
daY'8 earlier. Tatt'. administration had followed a polioY' of non-interterence 
IliS8 ThQlDas write. that ainoe Madero _s ahot while in the custody of General 
Huerta, President Tart deolined to take al\Y immediate aotion 1Ihich might 
prove embarrassing to the inooming president. At the same time, Taft 
believed Huerta would be reoognized eventuall1.16 Wileon, 1n his Maroh 11. 
1913, statement outlined his friendly attitude towards Latin .Amerioa. He 
deolared his adminiatratlonwas for responsible governments in Latin Amerioa • 
...... -----.. __ ..... 
IS Ibid.. 775. 
-
14 Ibid., 777. 
-
15 Ibid •• 784-812. 
-
16 Thomas, 26. 
-S 
He said. "We hold that just gOTerDlllent rests upon the consent of the 
governed ••• "11 This seeaed to indicate that he was not going to reoognize 
the bea...,. handed depotism of Huerta, and that he desired to he Ip Mexico 
towards an era of democracy. In the same address, he implied that the United 
states lIOuld not seek territory in lAtin .America. He also spoke of hie 0021-
cern for the trade relations between the two oontinentsl "The United States 
has nothing to aeek in Central and South Amerioa exoept the lasting interests 
of the people a of the two continents, the aeourity of gOTerDlllents intended to 
the people and for no speoial group or interest, and the development of 
personal and trade relationships between the two continents Whioh shall 
redound to the profits and advantages of both and interfere with the rights 
and liberties ot neither."lS 
Wilson's first plan was to unite the people of the two continents for 
praotical reasona. This Pan-American idea was not n..... It goes baok to 
John Quinoy Adams. BeDZ7 Clay. James Monroe, and James G. Blaine had carried 
it on. The president. in his Maroh 11, 1913, speeoh tried to lessen the 
Latin Amer ican s. pioionl whioh had been growing since the Unl ted Statel had 
annexed Texas. Theodore RooseTelt's "big stiok" policy and the Panama 
revolution, as well as the "dollar diplomacy" of Knox and Tart had made Latin 
-_ .. _-----------
11 Edgar E. Robinson &: Victor J. West, The Foreign POliOZ of Woodrow Wilson. 
1913-1911, Macmlllan Co •• B.T., 191i;"T19 et seq. -
.. -----
18 "President Wl1aon And Latin America," The American Journal of Iuter-
ational ~, Baker, Voorhh &: Co., N.t:";"'l§lS. Voi. 7, 332.-
p 
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9 
Amerioan teeling run high. The beliet, which Woodrow Wilson also shared, 
that Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson and speoial American interest played a 
re.ponsible role in the revolt against Madero e.peoially antagonized some 
Mexican •• 19 Prie.tley oomment. on the ambassador's attitude toward Madero 
thus I 
-.... -~----.-.---
Henry Lane Wil.oll was in1m1oal to 
.dero throughout the Tragio Ten Day. 
(the ten day. betore .dero was made 
prisoner by Huerta). The Imbas.., 
(American) •• the oenter o~lanti-gOTern­
ment aotivity. Huerta and Dlas visited 
him there OIl the night of February 18. 
and talked with him ooncerning their 
paot for the division ot the governmental 
powers they had sehed. There the D8mel 
ot the prospeotive mini.ters were discus-
sed and agreed upon. Wilson then sub-
mitted them to the toreign ministers, 
who were waitiug in an adjoining room. 
and asked their oomment s, in case an.y ot 
the appointments .eemed inappropriate. 
The .inisters merely took note ot the" 
but made no c <IIIIIlent. • • • Huerta and Diaa 
shortly thereatter ]a tt, singly. The 
memberl or the Corps, on taking their 
farewelll, expressed 80licitude tor the 
li .... s ot the imprisoned executives. 
Mr. Wil.oll .eemed not deeply moved. Hi. 
a.sooiat •• noted that he had felt tree to 
lend hi. influence to the destruction ot 
a legitimate govermnent and to listen to 
plans tor the organbation ot the usurping 
taction, but when it came to proposals to 
eav. the liTes ot the prisoners, he had no 
plans, nor even suggestions to otter.20 
19 Harley Botter, The Orj!in. ot the Foreili Policy of Woodrow Wilson, The 
Johns Hopkins Press, ItlDiore -;-I'931, 2. -
20 Priestley, 415. 
11 
reoognized Huerta. John Lina. Governor of Minnesota. was sent to Mexioo as a 
_peoial agent of Woodrow Wilson. Wilson's intention ._ to give aotive 
assistance to Mexioo to help it out of its difficulties. So instead of keep-
ing to his "hands off" polioy as expressed in his Maroh 11, 1913 speeoh, and 
to the ~tme honored policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of 
foreign nations he proposed the following terms through Lind, 
1) The immediate oessation of fighting 
throughout Mexico ••• 
2) Seourity for an early and tree election ••• 
3) Consent of General Huerta not to be a 
candidate in the forthooming eleotion ••• 
4) The agreement of all parties to abide 
by the result ot the eleotion ••• 
Huerta rejeoted the proposals. His Seoretary ot Foreign Affairs, F. Gamboa, 
sent fOrmAl notice ot rejeotion; "Mexioo oan not for one moment take into 
consideration the four '0 onditi ons which His Excellency Mr. Wilson has been 
pleased to propose through your honorable and worthy channel ••• "23 Because 
Huerta flatly rejeoted the oondi tions presented by Lind, the president 
deoided to bring pUblio pressure upon Huerta in his aessage ot August 27, 
1913, to Congress. Wilson wanted to tell the nation ot his proposals and the 
principle of his policy toward Mexioo. He spoke ot the obligations ot the 
United state. government to protect American interests but he put forth first 
the "obligation to Mexico herself." American friendship should be such as to 
lead to willing saorifices in Mexicots time of trouble. By sacrifices, he 
meant the curtailment of American interest in Mexioo. The United States 
should be interested in the "peace, prosperity, and contentment of Mexico." 
Thi. was to be accomplished by "an enlargement of the field of selt-govern-
------_ ....... -----
23 The Am. Jour. Intnat'l.14w, 1913, Vol. 1 supp., 219-292. See al.o 
CoT;"insor;"&-Ylest 15.. -
12 
ment and the reali&.tion of the hopes and rights of a nation with whose best 
aspirations, 10 long suppressed and disappointed, we deeply s,ympathize." 
Huerta was not able to restore order so President Wilson belieTed it the dut.y 
of the United States government to volunteer to assist to bring about peace 
and "set up a universally acknowledged political authority" in Mexico. This 
was his reason for sending Lind to Mexico. This address also announced 
Wilson's future policy. It contained the spirit of Wilson's diplomacy 
throughout his tem, "Meanwhile, what 18 it our duty to do? Clearly, every-
thing that we do must be rooted in patienoe and done with calm and dill-
interested deliberation.... we oan afford to exercise the selt-restraint of 
a really great nation Which realizes its own strength and scorns to misuse it 
It was our duty to offer our active assistance. It i8 now our dut,y to ahow 
what true neutrality will do to enable the people of Jlexico to set their 
atfairs in order again and wait for a furthe~ opportunity to ofter our 
friendly counsels •••• n24 
After Huerta rejeoted the President's proposals, Wilsonts stand beoame 
more aggressive. OtShaughnes~ sent a message to Wilson dated October 13, 
1913, .tating that Buerta dissolved the Congress, assumed the powers granted 
the oongress in the Departments ot Govermnent, Finanoe, and War. Jnd on 
October 2~rd another message was reoeived from 0' Shaughnessy stating that 
ma~ deputies had been arrested on the dissolution ot the Chamber. American 
....... -... _-------
24 con,ressional Record, 63 Cong •• 1 sess., 1913, Vol. 50, 3803, (B. Doc. 
20!. For oomments on the president's speeoh see Robinson & West, 16-18. 
13 
relations with Mexico were now in a deadlock. On October 26, 1913, Huerta 
was eleoted President ot I8xioo.25 
The next step in Wilson t a Latin American policy _s announced at Mobile 
Alabama, October 27th, 1913, one day atter Huerta'. eleotion. The tull 
meaning of his foreign polioy now became absolutely clear. He pointed out th 
danger involTed in the ooncessions obtained by toreign investors in Latin 
America. He predicted ~hat eTentually these conoessions would be replaoed by 
iuvestments. The president saw the difference between his ideal and the 
aotions of his oountry in the paat. He stated that "the United State. will 
neTer again seek one additional foot ot territory by conquest. 1t He advocated 
const! tutional liberty, "Human rights, national integrity, and opportunity aa 
against material interests -- that ••• is the issue.,,2S 
Robinson adequately summarized Wilsonts foreign polioy by stating that 
it was tir.aly established betore the expiration ot 1913. Fair dealing in-
volTed a retusal to tolerate the "extension ot the finanoial interest of the 
United States at the expense of peoples less advanoed industrially, hi.ndlT 
oo-operation embodied in a moral support ot the torces ot law and ord~r and a 
reliance upon the universal principle of l.lf-goTernment.... At all times 
--.... _-..... _----. 
26 For. Rels., 1913, 838-850. 
--
26 James Brown Soott, ed., President Wilson's Foreign POli~, Oxford 
Universlt.1 Pres., N.Y., 1918, 19-26. These pages glT. 11 text ot the 
president t. speeoh. For cClIIIIIIlents see Robinson &: West. 21 J alao, Notter, 
266-72. 
jiP 
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emphases had been placed upon the spirit ot the United states rather than 
upon their might aa a Dation •• 27 Botter, in a like Tain, aaid that the 
questions Wilson dealt with were not mere matters ot diplomacy ••• but were 
"shot through with the principles ot life. Morality, not expedience" must be 
our ~ide. By the end ot 1913, the preaident maintained an attitude ot 
"watchful waiting." Constitutional gOTernment must be eatablished in Mexico 
to obtain peaoe in America.26 In his annual aessage to Congress, December 2, 
1913, Wil.on surveyed his foreign policy. He continued advooating peace. He 
declared that the United States was the ohampion ot "constitutional goverDlDeni 
in AmericaJ we are more than friends, we are its championsJ Decause in no 
other ,...y can our neighbors, to whom we would wish in every ,...y to make proot 
ot our friendship, work out their own developaent in peace and liberty •••• 1t 
If' Huerta prevented a real government frClll being inaugurated and "has made it 
doubtful whether even the most elementary and rundamental right. either of her 
own people or of the oitizens ot other countries resident .tthin her territor~ 
oan long be aucoeaatull,. sateguarded, and which threatens. it long continued, 
to imperil the interest ot peaoe, order, and 'tolerable lite in the land. 
immediatel,. to the aouth ot us.... By a little every day his power and 
prestige are orumbling and the collapae is not tar a .... y. We shall not, I 
believe. be obligated to a:a.ter our pOlicf ot watchful waiting. 29 
---... _---------
27 Robinson & West,28. 
28 Notter, 272. See also Robinson & West, 23. 
29 Cong. !!!., 63 Cong., 2 8eS8., 1913, Vol. 51, 43. 
jIP 
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Wilson t IS Den important step .... to raise the arms embargo against 
)lexioo. Lind reoommended that Carraua be supported. Thh marked a change 
in policy trca passive waiting to poai tive aotion. PreTiously, the president 
had been neutral toward the different factions except Huertistos, warring for 
the Jlexican gOTerIDllent. He adTocated a fair election of SCIRe one other than 
Huerta. Despite the arms embargo ot the United States Huerta reoeived arms 
frOll toreign govermaEll'lta who reccgnized him, but, of course, the other 
factions could not. Reither could they receive arms fraa the United States 
which by lifting the embargo wculd seem. to endorse the rebel leader. Carranza. 
However. Wilson believed that the basis for the revolution was the land 
question and that the oonstitutionalists were going to provide adequate ca-
peneation in this case. By allowing the forcea of Carraua to reoeive 
.Amerioan arms, it was hoped that the resulting oivil .... r would reaoh-e the 
issue in a more satisfactory Jl8.nner than to have a toreign po .... r interfere 
which would make the problem more difficult.SO Wilson uneasily lifted the 
anus .. bargo February 3, 191.: 
-----,.-------.... 
so )lotter, 283. 
A PROCLAIIATIOB 
Whereas, by a Proolamation ot the 
President issued on Vareh 14, 1912 ••• 
it was declared that there existed in 
Mexioo oonditions of dcaestio violence 
whioh .. ere promoted by the use of arms 
or munitions of ..... r procured £rca 
the United State •••• it thereupon be-
came unlawfal to export arms or munitions 
,. 
ot war to Mexico... Now. theretore. I. 
Woodrow Wilson •••• hereby deolare and 
proclaim that. as the oonditions on 
whioh the Proclamation ot March 14. 1912, 
_s based bave essentially o hanged • 
aDd as it 11 desirable to plaoe the 
United state. with reterence to the 
exportation or arma or munitions ot 
war to Mexioo in the ...... e position as 
other Powers. the Rid Proclamation is 
hereby revoked ••• l1 
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Commenting on the President' 8 Proolamati on ot February 3. 1914. an editorial 
in the Amerioan Journal ot Internati ona1 Law .tated it the preeideut had T _~ __
reoognized Huerta. Carranza would have been regarded eL' a rebel in anns 
against the legitimate government ot Mexico. If no party was reoognized. 
there existed no 18 gal government. As matters .tood the law ot )(arch 14, 
1912. worked against the oonstitutionaliat.and in tavor ot Huerta wbo 118.. 
able to obtain munitions tram toreign nations .inoe he was recognized by most 
ot them. Consequently, Wilson wi thdrew the embargo on the importation ot 
arms and thus plaoed the 1I8.rring group. upon an equal ba.i •• 32 
The United States was hoping that Mexioo, it lett tree to settle her 
attair. a. Boon as possible would be able to put them on a oonstitutional 
basis by her own torce. But the oonstitutionalist. made little u.e ot their 
better equipnent. They _de no important military gains. Wilson' 8 hopes tor 
settlement in the immediate future were not realized.13 
-----~--.---",.--
31 For. Rels., 1914, .... 8. 
--
32 "Mediation In Kexioo." .Amerioan Journal ot International Law, 1914, Vol. 8 
680. --
33 Robinson & West, 26. 
F 
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On April 9, 1914, Adairal Mayo of the United States Navy sent the 
following telegram to General Zaragoza:M 
u.S.S. DOlihin 
Tampioo, April 9,914 
This morning an officer ••• of the Mexican 
military forees arrestea and marohed through 
the .~reet of Tampico a oommissioned otfioer 
ot the United State. Na'7, the Paymaster ot 
the U.S.8. Dolphin. together with .even men 
composing tKe or .... or the ... Dol!h1n. 
At the tiae of this arres~ t:e otticer and 
.en ooncerned were unarmed and engaged in 
loading Oa8e8 ot ga80line whioh had been 
purchased on Sbore ••• • 35 
Mayo 
The men were released and Admiral Mayo was tendered an apology and an 
expre8sion ot regret fra Huerta. But Jlayo d8ll&ll.ded a fOrmAl apology. the 
salute of twenty-one gulls to be giTeXl the United State. rlag. Huerta refused. 
Pres1dent W1110D ordered the North Amerioan fleet to the east oO&st of Mexico 
and on April 15th, the Pacific tleet to the west coast. The ports of Tampioo 
and Vera Cruz on the east ooast and ports on the west 00a8t were sebed 80 as 
to blookade Mexico. 36 On April 20. 191-1. Wilson 1I8J1t betore Congress to give 
an acoount of the Tampioo affair. In t his message the President stated that 
this act was made to entoroe respect tor the United States. He said that the 
Tampioo affair was not an isolated inoident. A series ot incidents had 
ocourred whioh showed that Huerta had little regard for the dignity ot the 
-------.... -----
34 Coaanding the Huertieta toroes resisting the Constitutionalists at 
Tampioo. 
35 ~.!!!! •• 1914, 448..!.! seq. 
36 Robinson & West, 32. 
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United States government. War was not his a1m but he asked approval of Con-
gresl to use the armed forces of the United State. to obtain from Huerta and 
his adherent. full reccgnition of the right. and dignity of the United States 
ttl, therefore, Ct1ll8 to ask your apprO'9'&l that I Ihould use the armed forces 
ot the United States in suoh ways and to such an extent as may be necessary t 
obtain from Geural Huerta and his adherents the tullest recognition ot the 
rights and dignity ot the United States, even amidst the distressing con-
dition ••• in Mexioo. ttS1 As has been indicated otten, Wilson's demands were 
made to the president ot Mexioo lIhom he did not recognbe al existing. 
On the 21st ot April, the custea house at Vera Cruz was taken by 
Amerioan mariuI, and on the 22nd, the port ot Vera Crus was ocoupied. The 
blooade of the Mexican coast and seizure of the ports of Tampico and Vera 
Cruz cut ctt the munitions Huerta 1I8.S reoeiving through Vera Crus. Wilson 
expressed his teelings to his private secretarY', Joseph P. Tumulty, bY' 
saying. "It is too bad, isn't it, but we could not allow that oargo to land. 
The Jlexicans intend using those guns upon cur own boY'S. It ts hard to take 
action of this ldnd. I have tried to keep out ot this Jlexican mess, but we 
are now on the brink ot war and there i. no alternative."S8 Diplomatic 
relations were levered by Huerta. EYen General Carranza protested this 
invasion ot Mexican soila "In the taoe of the real situation ot Mexioo ••• 
... ------------.. 
31 Es.!!!., 6S Cong., 2 sess., 1914, Vol. 51,6908, (H. Doc. 910). 
38 JOleph P. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As I Know H1m, Doubleday, Page &: Co., 
N.Y., 1921. 152. - - --
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and oonsid.ring the aots oommitted at Vera Cruz to be highly ottensive to the 
dignity and independenoe ot Mexioo •••• I interpr.t the 8enttRent ot the great 
majority ot the Mexioan peopl •••• and invite you ••• to order your torc •• to 
evacuate all places that th.,.. hold in the port ot V.ra Cruz, and to preseDt 
to the Con.titutionalist Goverma.nt. which I a. Constitutional Gov.rnor of the 
State of Coahuila aDd First Chiet of the Constitutionalist Army r.pr ••• nt, 
the demand on the part of the Unit.d Stat.s in regard to acta recently CClll-
_itt.d at the port of ~pioo •••• ·39 The .ituation was b.coming dang.rous. 
Wilson had to u ••• v.~ ounce ot patience to keep the .ituation steady. He 
was the lonelie.t man in Washington.4O 
At this point. on April 25th. the gov.rmaent ot Argentina, Brazil, and 
Chile tendered their good ottice. to bring about .ome .olution to the problem. 
Wilson acc.pt.d 1lIImediately. Still his obj.ct was re-.stablishment ot con-
stitutional govermaeat. Be wanted the oreation of' Ita single provisional 
government acceptable to all parti ••••• upon the bas •• of such reforms as will 
satisty the just claim. ot the people ot Mexico to lite. liberty and inde-
pendent .8lt .upport •• '1 On Kay 18, 1914, the conter.noe began. The first 
me.ting was held at Niagara Falls. Canada. The plan proposed by the American 
r.presentatives asked for the removal ot Hu.rta, "that a provi.ional govern-
Mnt. repr.senting constitutionalist sentiment should be appointed. that the 
---------------
S9 For. Rels., 1914, 477-484. 
--
40 Tumulty, 154. 
41 lotter. 297. 
, I 
!, 
president should be pledged to carry into ettect the 8fJ'Il rian and other 
t t "'2 re onas, .!..!. •••• 
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The mediation accoaplished little in paoifying Mexioo but it prOBoted 
Pan-Amerioan friendship. It also enabled Wilson to maintain the status quo 
in Vera Cruz until he oould withdraw the .Amerioan forces. '3 
As is _11 moWD. much pressure was brought to bear upon Huerta that on 
July 15, 1914, he resigned aDd sailed for Spain. The able and honorable 
Francisco Carbajal, formerly Chief Justioe of the Supreme Court ot Mexioo and 
reoently appointed Minister ot Foreign Affairs was named Provisional 
President.44 
The Wilson administration justified it.elt for not reoognizing Huerta's 
government because ot the fate of Madero, Buerta' s failure to hold a real 
eleotion, and the fact that he did not control, at anyone time, the larger 
part ot .xioo. To reoognize Huerta would have .. ant reoognition ot a 
military leade~ and this would have given a stimulus to other military leaders 
who wished to establish a military dictatorship.45 
---..... --.. _--_ .... 
42 For. Rels., 1914, 538. For further information regarding this oonterenoe, 
lti proposals and ameadments eto., see pages 488 et seq. 
- --
43 Rippy, 41. 
44 For. Rels., 1914, 563. 
--
45 Stuart Alexander KaoCorkle, Ph.D., "Amero iean Polioy Towards Kexioo," The 
Johns Hopkins u.niversi~ Studies in Historical And Politioal Soience, 
!aitLaore, ¥he JobD:s Hopkins PresS; 1933, 91;' -
CHAPTER II 
AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH CARRANZA 
Mexico was still in chaos. Huerta was gone but the various army chiets 
tought for supremaoy among themselves. This caused the revolution to be pro-
longed a t. more years. Wilson was anxious to see a Bound. permanent govern-
ment set up by Carranza. Finally, the oonstitutionalists gained control ot 
the north and entered Mexico City on August 22, 1914, seventeen months atter 
Carranza began his struggle. Be announced that he had taken charge ot the 
executive power aocording to the Plan of Guadalupe. This plan dated March 26, 
1913, deolared the prinCiples upon which the Carranza revolution was founded, 
Whereas the ls gillative and judicial 
powers have recognized and protected 
General Huerta and his illegal and 
anti-patriotic proceedings contrar,y 
to constitutional laws and precepts; 
••• we, the undersigned, chiets and 
otfioers oommanding the oonstitu-
tionalist toroes, have agreed upon 
and shall sustain with arms the tol-
lowing: 
1. General Victoriano Huerta is here-
by repudiated as President of the Re-
publio •••• 
4. For the purpose of organizing the 
armywhioh is to see that our aims are 
carried out, we name Venustiano Carranza, 
now governor of the State of Coahuila, 
as first Chief of the army which is to 
be oalled "Constitutionalist Army." 
5. Upon the ocoupation of the City 
of Mexico by the Constitutionalist Army, 
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the exeoutive power shall be vested in 
Venustiano Carranza, its first ohief, or 
in the person who will substitute him in 
oommand. 
6. The provisional trustee or the exeo-
utive power of the Republio shall oonvene 
general elections as soon as peaoe may have 
been restored and will surrender power to 
the oitizen who may have been elected. l 
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This deolaration was supposed to have been signed by sixty-tour offioers of 
the troops or the State of Coahuila. With these troops Carranza, then gover-
nor or that state, began his revolution against Huerta's government after the 
death ot Franoesco Madero. 
Zapata and Villa were two revolutionists who oombined their toroes 
against Carranza after Huerta's downfall. Chaotic conditions became 
intensitied. Events moved rapidly. Villa repudiated the government set up 
by Carranza. Be said he was convinced that Carranza was incapable ot re-
establishing a democratic government. On September 30, 1914, Villa issued 
his manifesto which contained points against Carranza. In the next month, 
Carransa issued a Proclamation charging Villa with insincerity. A convention 
was held at AgU&scalientes consisting of all the generals in the Mexican Army 
who opposed Carranza's government. On November 2, 1914, they elected a 
I Provisional President, General Eulalio Gutierrez, Governor of the State ot 
I 
Luis Potosi. Eight days later ~his convention deolared Carranza a rebel. 
I General Gutierrez appointed Villa head of the convention ar.my. General 
-----------.---
1 Thomas Edward Gibbon Mexioo Under Carransa, Doubleday, Page & Co., N.Y., 
1919, 47. See also For. Re1s., 1914, 589. 
,. 
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Obreg6n, head of the constitutionalist anty', deolared war on Villa. Carranza 
temporarily established hi' goverument at Vera Cruz. On December 12, 1914, 
he issued his Declaration and Decre. stating his position as executive and 
his intention to hold that places 
That the underasigned, in his capacity 
as constitutional governor of the state 
of Coahuila, had solemnly taken the oath 
to observe and cau.. the general COD-
stitution to be observed, and that com-
plying with this duty and of the above 
oath, he was inevitably obliged to a-
rise in arms to oppose the usurpation 
of Huerta and to restore constitutional 
order in the Republic of Mexico. 
That, it being imperative, therefore, 
that the interruption of constitutional 
order should subsist during this new 
period of struggle, the Plan of Guada-
lupe should therefore, continue to be in 
foroe, as it has been the guidance and 
banner of it, until the enemy may have 
been overpowered completely in order 
that the constitution may be restored ••• 2 
Wilson tried to adjust the differences between Carranza and his enemies. 
Everything was done to reach 80me settlement between the tacti ons and, at the 
same time, protect the perwonal and property rights of .Americans. To support 
his return to a non-intervention policy, Wilson ordered that the American 
marines leave Vera Cruz by Bovember 23, 1914.3 Notter 8~ates that his aotion 
was consistent with the essential part of Wilson's policy of building up 
......... _---._---.... 
2 For. Rels., 1914, 629-633. Gibbon, 48. 
--
3 For. Rels., 1914, 690-626. 
--
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friendship with Latin American countries. During December, 1914, and 
January, 1915, dissension among the rebel leaders increased. The president 
continued to avoid armed intervention. Meanwhile, the press oontinually 
oal1ed tor intervention.4 
Wilson believed some aotion should be taken. In his June 2, 1915, 
statement he oalled upon the various taotions to get together to settle their 
differenoes tor Mexioo's reliet or the United States would lend its moral 
support "to 801le man or group of men, if suoh may be found, who can rally the 
suffering people of Mexico to their support in an effort to ignore, if they 
cannot unite the warring factions of the country, return to the constitution 
of the republio so long in abeyanoe, and set up a Government at Mexioo City 
which the great powers of the world oan reoognize and deal with --a Govern-
ment with whom the program of the revolution will be a business and not 
merely a platfor.m."5 The conventionists were quarrelling among themselves, 
consequently 'they were not making any headway under Carranza's control. .A. 
Pan-American Conferenoe which came into being to oonsider the matter, 
indicated that Carranza was the leader Who should receive their support. The 
members believed Carranza bad central authority among his forces while there 
seemed to be no oentral authori~ among the Villista foroes. The loyality and 
unity among Carranza adherents indicated that he had the more strength. Soon 
--.... _-..... __ ..... ..,--
4 Notter. 364 and 383. 
5 Robinson & West, 269. 
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atter the President's June 2, 1915 address, Carranza issued a Deolaration to 
the Mexican nation dated June 11, 1915, in which he said his government oon-
trolled over soven-eighths of the national territory, that it had organized 
public administration in twenty out ot twenty-seven states ot the Republio of 
Mexico, and that more than thirteen million of the fifteen million people 
were under his jurisdiction. Therefore, Carranza believed the time had come 
when his government should be recogni&ed by other nations espeoially the 
United States. He also appealed to the warring factions to submit to his 
government in order to obtain peace in Mexioo. General Carranza's olaim to 
recognition was aided When his confidential agent at Washington on October 7, 
1915, sent copies ot his Declarations ot December 12, 1914, and June 11, 1915 
to Wilson. In this letter Carranza assured the United States that the lives 
and property ot foreigners would be respeoted. He also said that his govern-
ment would recognize indemnities tor damages caused by the revolution. He 
conoludes that the laws of retorm would be observed and the constitutional 
government will respect everyone's llfe, property, and religion.6 
In the meantime Carranza reoccupied Mexico City. Atter examining the 
e~ent of Carranza's military control, it was decided by the members ot the 
conterence that he possessed the essentials tor recognition. On October 19, 
1915, Wilson recognized Carranza as chier executive ot the de ~ govern-
ment ot Mexico • 
. ., .. _---._------
6 "The Recognition of the De Facto Government in Mexico," The Am. Jour. 
1ntemat'l ~, 1916, vOl. 10, 362-366. - - -
,. 
.... 
The Secretary of State to the Confidential 
Agetlt of the !!. facto Government of Mexico 
Department cf Stat. 
Washington, October 19, 1915 
My dear Mr. Arredondo: 
It is my pleasure to inform you that 
the President of the United States takes 
this opportunity of extending recognition 
to the de facto Government of Mexico, of 
which dinera! Venustiano Carranza is the 
Chief Executive.7 
Robert Lans ing 
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An article was printed in The Nation entitled "Brighter Days for Mexico" wh1c 
----
stated that regarding recognition of Carranza a8 against the other men in the 
field warring for reform aDd reconstruction, Carranza was the result of a 
prooess of elimination. His reoognition came about following the united 
efforts of the republics of Latin America, "Racially and by political 
experienoe they are better qualified than we to understand foroes and 
personalities in Mexioo ••• • Conferences with Latin American republics tended 
to reduce their suspioions of the motives of the United States which were 
brought about by big business interest.8 At this time, Carranza was still 
not able to maintain order throughout the ~ole of Mexico. Villa continued 
to harass the country and to make raids on the American border. Actually, 
Carranza WaS not elected president until March 12, 1917.9 Wilson gave 
Carranza his baRediate support by proclaiming an e.'argo OD the shipment ot 
--... _----.----... 
T For. Rels., 1916, 171. 
--
8 "Brighter Days for Kex100,· !!!. Batio!, October 14, 1915, 461. 
9 For. Rels., 1911, 910. 
--
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ar.mS to all anti-government partiel in Mexioo. lO But the faot that Carranza 
.as not duly eleoted until much later leads one to believe that expediency 
played a large part in reoognition, and it is clear that for a year and a 
half WilBon was reoognizing a militarist type of government whioh he had 
previously oondemned in the instance ot Huerta. 
At this time, Europe was in turmoil and holding the attention of the 
world. ll Wilson, in his annual message to oongress, Deoember 1, 1915, spoke 
of the community of interests 8Ilong the American statess "The moral is, that 
the states of America are not hostile rivals but co-operating friends, and 
that their growing sense of cOJllDlunity of interest, alike in matters politioal 
and in matters economic, i. likely to give them a new significance as faotors 
in international attairs and in the political histor,y of the world."l2 In 
this statement one oan see that particular attention was oalled to the taot 
that the president looked beyond the present value ot the growing unity of 
the Latin American oountries in ideals and interests to its importanoe for tht 
time ot readjustment atter the war tor the future. After the war, the Latin 
American countries would cooperate commercially for pre-w.r eoonomio adjust-
ments. A united America would not only be an advantage against foreign 
enarO'achment here but it could be of service to Europe by giving economic aid~ 
Dloral example, and leadership. In his January 6, 1916, statement, Wilson 
_ ... _-- ....... -------
10 Botter, 452. 
11 MaoCorkle, 93. 
12 Cong. !!!., 64 Cong., 1 ses8., 1916, Vol. 53, 95. 
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again spoke ot his desire for friendliness and co-operation between all 
American states. He stressed the chiet features of this Pan-American 
program; to guarantee to each other absolute political independence and 
territorial integrity and to settle all disputes by arbitration.13 
The recognition ot Carranza's de facto government did not bring peaoe. 
----
The events in Mexico were inoreasing the difficulties of this government to 
maintain its non-intervention policy. Inoidents along the border eX~8perated 
our congressmen. Some demanded intervention. Then on March 8, 1916, General 
Villa attaoked the town of Columbus, New Mexico and killed seventeen 
Americans. Now drastic measures had to be taken. The president sent forces 
to Mexioo to capture Villa. 
The Adjutant General 
to General Funston 
War Department 
'Washington, )(aroh 10, 1916 
Prelident has direoted that an armed foree 
be lent into Mexico with the lole objeot of 
capturing Villa and preventing any further 
raids by his band, and with scrupulous re-
gard to sovereignty of Mexico ••• 14 
IIcCain 
General Carranza had given his consent reluctantly for American troops to 
... _----.. -_ .. ----
13 Robinson &: West, 82. 
14 For. Rela •• 1916, 483. 
--
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pursue bandits in Mexico. General John J. Pershing did not receive any 
assistance from him to accomplish his purpose. Carr.nza aenied him the use 
of ral1w.ya tor tr.nsportation of supplies, forbade the occupation of towns, 
and made no eftort of his own to oapture Villa. In April, Carranza also re-
quested the withdrawal of Amerioan forces tram Mexioo. Pershing believed 
that he w.s actually encountering aotive opposition tram the constitution-
alists: 
General FUnston to the 
Adjutant General 
Fort Sam Houston 
April 17, 1916 
Following just received trom Pershing: 
Bam.1quipa 
April 17, 1916 
••• M.y opinion ls, general attitude Car-
ranza has been one ot obstruction. This 
also universal opinion Army offioers this 
expedition. Carranz. toroes report all 
acts against Villa forces and death of 
Vl1la leaders. Activity Carranza toroe 
in territory through which we have oper-
ated probably intentionally obstructive 
•••• 15 
Funston 
In order to reaoh .ome agreement, Lansing initiated a conference between 
General Hugh S. Soott of the American forces and the constitutionalist 
I General Alvaro Obregon. At this oonference it was revealed that Carranza 
... _-----_ .... ---
15 For. Rels., 1916, 822. 
--
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wished to disouss completion ot the withdrawal ot American torces. Be turned 
a deaf ear to any talk of cooperation or mutual agreement. The War Depart-
ment retaliated by an embargo on shipments of arms and munitions to Mexico. 
The final deoision given at the oonterence was that our troops lICuld be with-
drawn but gradually. Carranza refused to sign the agreement because no date 
tor complete withdrawal wa. pravided. The Mexican government pr<aised to 
prevent f'urther raids on the border. But May, 1916, brought new raids on 
Glen Springs and Banqul1las. tex.s. l6 
I The conferences between Carranza's minister of' War, Obregon and 
Generals Scott and Funston held during April and May did not bring relief to 
the situation. The breaking point ooourred May 24::. 1916. On thb date, 
Carranza sent an ill-tempered note to the United States' Department of' State. 
In its sharp and bitter terms it charged the American government with bad 
taith and demanded the immediate withdrawal ot American toroes trom Mexico. 
He asked this government of ita true intention toward Mexico • 
..... _----_ .. _----
• •• 
The Mexican Government oonsiders it 
neoessary to take advantage of this op-
portunity to request of the ..American 
Government a more oategorical detini-
tion of' ita true intentions toward Mexioo 
•••• The American Government for some 
time paat haa been making assuranoe of 
friendship to the Latin Amerioan 
people, and has taken aavantage 
ot every opportunity to convinoe 
them that it wishes to respeot 
16 For. Rels., 1916, 544. 
--
their sovereignty absolu't;ely. 
Espeoially with respeot to Mex-
ioo the Amerioan Government has 
deolared on various occasions that 
it was not its intention to intervene 
in any manner in its interior af-
fairs and that it desires to leave 
it to our countr,r to work out alone 
its diffiault and varied problema 
of politioal and social transfor-
mation •••• 
The Mexioan Government has, never-
theless, to confess that the acts of 
the Amerioan military authorities are 
in direot oontradiotion to the state-
ments above referred to, and finds 
itself forced, therefore, to appeal 
to the President, the Department of 
State, the senate and the American 
people, for a definition ••• of the 
true political intentions of the 
United States as regards Mexico •••• 
The Mexican Government invites 
the Government of the United States 
to bring about a oessation of this 
situation of uncertainty between the 
two countries and to support its 
deolarations and assuranoes of 
friendship with real and effeotive 
a.ots whioh shall convince the Mex-
ioan people of the sinoerity of its 
proposa.ls. These acts at the moment 
can not be other than the immediate 
withdrawal of the American troops 
which are to-day on Mexican terrltory •••• 17 
C. Aquilar 
This brought on a deadlock in the relations between Mexico and the 
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United States. Withdrawal of troops without sucoess would be a blow to 
Wilson's prestige during a presidential election year. The troops stayed. 
17 Foreie: Relations, 1916, 552-563. C. Aquilar was Secretary of Foreign 
Relations of the de facto government of Mexico. 
~~------------~ 
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War seemed imminent. If Wilson bad taken this opportunity to sever rela-
tiona with Mexico for the redress of American wrongs, he would have had a 
united nation backing him. Even if the ~ facto government was not respon-
sible for the raids, its attitude towards them was indifferent and almost 
suspicious. The Pershing expedition was the result of many wrongs which 
the de facto government had not even attempted to correct. With Carranza's 
help, it is believed that Villa could have been captured. But, in explana-
tion of Carranza's actions, he was probably suspicious of the United states. 
This country had occupied Haiti in 1915 and Santo Domingo in 1916.18 Also, 
there were many stories in the American press oalling for annexation of 
Mexioo to the United States. 
On June 20, 1916, Wilson sent his answer to Carranza. In it he stated 
his refusal to withdraw the American marines as long as they constituted 
the only check against intolerable grievanoes and bandit outrages: 
-~-------------
••• 
The Government of the United States 
has viewed with deep concern and in-
oreasing disappointment the progress 
of the revolution in Mexico. Con-
tinuous bloodshed and disorders have 
marked its progress. For three years 
the Mexican Republic has been torn with 
civil strife; the lives of Americans 
and other aliens have been sacrificed; 
vast properties developed by American 
capital and enterprise bave been 
destroyed or rendered nonproductive; 
bandits have been permitted to roam 
18 Gruening, 591. 
at will through the territor,y contig-
uous to the United States and to seize, 
without punishment or without effective 
attempt at punishment, the property 
of Americans, while the lives of cit-
izens of the United States who ventured 
to remain in Mexican territor,y or to 
return there to proteot their interests, 
have been taken, and in some cases 
barbarously taken, and the murderers 
have neither been apprehended nor 
brought to justice •••• 
In these attacks on American ter-
ritory, Carranoista adherents, and 
even Carrancista soldiers took part 
in the looting, burning and killing. 
Not only were these murders charac-
terized by ruthless brutality, but 
uncivilized acts of mutilation were 
perpetrated •••• Since these attacks, 
leaders of the bandits well known 
both to Mexican civil and military 
authorities as well as to American 
officers have been enjoying with 
impunity the liberty of the towns 
of northern Mexico. So far has the 
indifference of the de facto Govern-
ment to these atrocities gone that 
some of these leaders, as I am ad-
vised, have received not only the 
protection of the Government, but 
encouragement and aid as well.~ •• 
In the face of these depredations 
not only on American lives and property 
on Mexican soil but on American soldiers, 
citizens and homes on American ter-
ritory, the perpetrators of which Gen-
eral Carranza was unable or possibly 
considered it inadvisable to appre-
hend and punish, the United States had 
no recourse other than to employ force 
to disperse the bands of Mexican out-
laws who were with increasing boldness 
systematically raiding across the inter-
national boundary ••• 
\ 
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In conolusion, the Mexican Govern-
ment invites the United States to sup-
port its tlassurances of friendship 
with real and effective acts" which 
can be no other than the immediate 
withdrawal of the American troops. 
For the reasons I have herein fully 
set forth, this request of the de 
facto Government can not now be-enter-
tained. The United States has not 
sought the duty which has been forced 
upon it of pursuing bandits who under 
fundamental principles of municipal 
and international law, ought to be 
pursued and arrested and punished by 
Mexican authorities... If, on the con-
trary, the de facto Government is pleased 
to ignore thIs obligation and to believe 
that It in case of a refusal to retire 
these troops there is no further re-
oourse than to defend its territory 
by an appeal to arm ••• It the execution 
of this threat will lead to the gravest 
consequence ••• While this Government 
would deeply regret such a result, it 
cannot recede from its settled deter-
mination to maintain its national 
rights and to perform its full duty 
in preventing further invasions of 
the territory of the United States and 
in removing the peril whioh Americans 
along the international boundary have 
borne so lony with patience and for-bearance •••• 9 
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The events which followed were even more ominous. On the evening of 
June 21st, hostilities broke out at Carrizal between Pershing's and Carranza 
forces. Some United States cavalry men were killed and others taken prisoner 
In foroeful terms Lansing demanded the release of the Amerioan prisoners. 
19 Foreign Relations, 1916, 581-592. 
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There was more to follow. On June 26th, at Tampico, an American naval 
launch from the U.S.S. Marietta was fired on without warning by Constitu-
tionalist forces. On July 4th, the ~ facto government suggested that the 
offer of mediation from the Latin American countries be accepted. On 
July 28th, the United states sent a note of acceptance. Wilson was re-
20 
lieved. 
To date, Wilson's policy was considered unsuccessful for our relations 
with Mexico were still strained. The Columbus massacre remained unpunished, 
Americans on the border were still being killed. Mexicans were also killed 
in retaliation in Texas. After the Carrizal incident, Wilson spoke before 
the Associated Advertising clubs at Philadelphia, June 29, 1916, rebuking 
those who advocated conquest of Mexico: 
------------... --
I believe ••• that America ••• should be 
ready in every point of policy and of 
action to vindicate at whatever cost 
the principles of liberty. of justice, 
and of humanity to which we have 
been devoted from the first.... It 
is easy to think first of the material 
interest of America, but it is not easy 
to think first of what Amerioa, if she 
loves justioe ought to do in the field 
of international affairs. I believe 
that at whatever cost America should 
be just to other peoples and treat 
other peoples as she demands that 
they should treat her.2l 
20 Ibid., 593-600. 
21 Congo ~., 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 1916, Vol. 53, App. 1302. 
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In his June 30th, 1916, address before the Press Club at New York he was 
more emphatic. He stated here that it was an easy thing to strike against 
another nation but striking was no way to oonserve the honour of the nation: 
••••• The easiest thing is to strike. The 
brutal thing is the impulsive thing •••• 
Do you think the glory of America 
would be enhanced by a war of oonquest 
in Mexico? Do you think that any. aot 
of violenoe by a powerful nation like 
this against a weak and destruotive 
neighbor would refleot distinotion upon 
the annals of the United States? 
••.•• ! have oonstantly to remind myself 
that I am not the servant of those who 
wish to enhanoe the value of their 
Mexioan investments, that I am the 
servant of the rank and. file of the 
people of the United States •••• 22 
Then on July 4, 1916, the president said: 
•••• .Amerioa did not oome into existence 
to make one more great nation in the 
family of nations, to show its strength 
and to exercise its mastery. America 
opened her doors to everybody who wanted 
to be free and to have the same oppor-
tunity that everybody else had to make 
the most of his faculties and his op-
portunities and America will retain its 
greatness only so long as it retains 
and seeks to realize those ideals. No 
man ought to suffer injustioe in Amerioa. 
No man ought in America to fail to see 
the dictates of humanity.23 
22 Conj2. ~., 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 1916, Vol. 53, App. 1315. 
23 Congo ~., 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 1916, Vol. 53, APp. 1396. 
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Again on .July 10, 1916, the president continued to emphasize his principle 
of justice and fairness: 
What makes Mexico suspicious of us is 
that she does not believe as yet that we 
want to serve her. She believes that we 
want to possess her, and she has justifi-
cation for the belief in the way in which 
some of our fellow ci,tizens have tried to 
exploit her privileges and possessions. 
For my part, I will not serve the ambi-
tions of these gentlemen, but I will try 
to serve all America, so far as inter~ 
oourse with Mexico is oonoerned, by 
trying to serve Mexico herself.... Of 
oourse, we must make good our own sover-
eignty of Mexioo.24 
The mediation commission held its first meeting on September 6, 1916. 
Th~ held numerous sessions but did not conclude their deliberations until 
1917. But hampered by conflicting intentions, the conventions never resulted 
in an agreement which Carranza would accept. Meanwhile, intervention and 
war had been avoided and the serious orises had passed.25 
The president in his 1916 campaign speeches discussed his foreign policy. 
On September 2, 1916, in accepting the nomination of the Demooratic Party for 
a seoond term as President, he justified his actions in Mexico and emphasized 
the signifioance of Latin American relations for the future. Regarding 
Mexico, his ideal was to respeot the sovereignty of the Mexioan people and 
help them to do away with misrule and foreign control. Again, as before, he 
plaoed Amerioan eoonomic power in a plaoe of service to American ideals. 
------------.. --
24 Cong. Reo., 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 1916, Vol. 53, .App. 1480. 
25 Notter, 535. 
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The president defended the charge that the Pershing expedition violated his 
principles. He said that the marines and soldiers entered Mexioo to vindi-
oate the sovereignty of the United States, a duty which Mexico was unable to 
accomplish and we did so without obstruction to the sovereign authority of 
Mexico. Some condemned his policy of non-recognition of Huerta. In answer, 
he said that he would not extend the hand of welcome to anyone who obtained 
26 power by treachery and violence. 
As the Pershing expedition came to an end a new problem was coming to a 
head. Withdrawal of Amerioan marines occured a week before Germany declared 
unrestrioted U-boat warfare. Carranza was elected President of Mexico, not 
by popular vote, but by the Mexican Congress sitting as an eleotoral college, 
Maroh 12, 1917.27 E!~ recognition was extended to Mexico by the United 
28 States on August 31, 1917. 
At this time, President Wilson's attentions were drawn elsewhere as he 
was concerned with the United States entering the great European conflict. 
As far as his Mexioan policy was concerned, the matter was ended. Future 
difficulties involved protection of Amerioan rights under Mexioo's Consti-
tution of 1917 drawn up by Carranza and his adherents. 29 
26 Cong. ~., 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 1916, Vol. 53, App. 1984. 
27 Notter, 618. 
28 ~ Am. Journ. Internation'l~, 1918, Vol. 12, 422. 
29 Notter, 618. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE MEXICAN CONSTITUTION OF 1917 
Carranza was an improvement over Huerta but he left much to be desired 
1 
as a chiet magistrate. With Carranza as president ot Mexico, some ot the 
more anxious problems between the United States and Mexican relations tram 
1917 on were oonoerned with property rights whioh were included in the new 
Mexican Constitution ot 1917.2 In this constitution ma~ ot the promises 
made by the Mexioan goverDlDent under Carranza were broken. He had stated 
that when he beoame established in the oity ot Mexico, he would call for the 
election ot oongressmen. He did not do so. In 1915, he oalled a constitu-
tional convention to enact a new constitution disregarding the one promul-
gated in 1857 Whioh he had pledged himself to uphold. The Constitution ot 
1857 had been adopted by a vote ot all the representatives ot the Mexican 
people but when he called tor the election ot delegates to the oonstitutional 
convention, some ot the states of Mexioo were still not under his oontrol. 
These states were not notitied, oonsequently, all the oities of Mexioo were 
not represented. 3 
---------------
1 Josephus Daniels, The Lite of Woodrow Wilson, 1856-1924, Will H. Johnson, 
1924,185. ---
2 Gruening, 595-596. 
3 Gibbon, 55-56. 
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-The artioles most oommented upon were those oonoerned with labor, 
religion, and the nationalization of the oountry's subsoil produots. 
Priestley comments on the Constitution of 1917, as follows: 
Whatever the benefits of the new oonsti-
tution, these were not the features whioh 
gave it its great notoriety. The salient 
points of interest in it are its new applioation 
of the principle of eminent domain and its 
care, metioulously expressed, for the welfare 
of the laboring olasses. With these also 
marches the determination to destroy the evils 
of authoritative control of the people by the 
church either through education or religion. 
It is dedicated to the rule of reason and of 
the proletariat ••• and it embodies the theory 
of social reorganization in the exhaustive 
way in which it attempts to protect the labor-
ing olass and forestall all its difficulties. 
It is in faot an attempt to institute a 
r'gime of state sooialism.4 
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The author further oomments that these prOVisions on labor under Article 123 
of the constitution are theoretical, not praotioal. This is dangerous for 
they try to create conditions rather than control existing ones. Some of 
the provisions which would be ideal for a highly industrialized society 
would prove the direct opposite when applied to domestic laborers. There 
are, however, some admirable qualities in this article such as special favor 
given women and ohild labor, minimum wage prOVisions, an eight hour day, 
and aooident oompensation, ~.5 Arthur Constantine, a special oorres-
pondant in Mexioo during this period oomments on Artiole 123 as follows: 
4 Priestley, 436-437. 
5 Ibid., 437. 
~--------------------------------~ 
> 
The socialistic influences which have been 
active among the Mexican revolutionists since 
the days of Madero have resulted in the incor-
poration in the new constitution of such radi-
cal (or advanced) legislation as the eight 
hour day •••• These are the salient features 
of the new Mexican Constitution now in force ••• 
Now that the dominant faction has obtained 
what it has so often stated it was fighting 
for. the hour of the test of its patriatism 
arrives ••• Those who have lived in Mexico 
during the comings and goings of revolution-
ary factions surmise that the test will try 
the soul of more than one patriot.6 
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James Lord, Treasurer of the Pan-American Federation of Labor and member of 
the Labor Commission to visit Mexico in 1918 writes that at that time labor 
was in a bad state of affairs. Carranza's government was a state socialist 
government, they did not believe in labor unions. instead. advocated govern-
ment control of industries to take charge of labor conditions, wages. and 
general welfare of the workers. He further claims that the Mexican worker 
never received enough wages to enable him to obtain a more substantial diet 
than frijoles and tortillas. This did not give him enough strength for the 
work he was expected to do. consequently, his efficiency was low. The 
author advocates better environment. food. and general conditions for the 
workers to be shown in their homes, hygene and cleanliness. Finally, he 
conoludes, the way to help Mexico is to help without trespassing, "to give 
them an opportunity to save themselves, and we will then see what they 
---------------
S Arthur Constantine, "The New Mexioan Constitution and Reforms," The 
Outlook, March 14, 1917. 456. 
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_ill do. n7 As for Carranza, he was a disappointment to the Mexioan workers 
who helped him into power. Their land of promise never materialized through 
8 him. 
Franois Kelley in his book, Blood-Drenohed Altars, writes with author-
ity on the religious perseoution in Mexioo. This situation permeated 
throughout the oonstitution under many of its artioles. Artiole 3 prohibits 
any religion from establishing or direoting primary sohools.9 The artiole 
itself reads as follows: 
Instruotion is free; that given in publio 
institutions of learning shall be seoular. Pri-
mary instruotion, whether higher or lower, given 
in private institutions shall likewise be seou-
lar. 
No religious corporation nor minister of 
any religious oreed shall establish or direot 
sohools of primary instruetion. 
Private primary schools may be established 
only subject to offioial supervision. 
Primary instruction in publio institu-
tions shall be gratuitous. lO 
Artiole 130 goes further; it ordered the confiscation of schools erected 
for teaohing religion and provided that all primary sohool matters be placed 
under the direotion of the federal government. No legal status was given 
to ohurohes. It also forbade any Mexioan to be a minister of any religious 
7 James Lord, "Labor in MeXiCO," Mexioo and the Caribbean, G. E. Steohert 
& Co., N.Y., 1920, edited by George H:lrlakeslee, 91-103 
8 ~., 103. 
9 Francis Clament Kelley, Blood-Drenohed Altars, The Bruce Publishing Co., 
Milwaukee, 1935, 261. 
10 H. N. Branch, "The Mexioan Constitution of 1917 Compared with the Con-
sti tution of 18571'1, ~ Annuals ~ ~ American Aca.demy 2! PoU tica.l ! 
Sooial Soience, Ma , supp., 1917 2. 
bn 
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creed, under penalty of loss of oitizenship. It prohibited ministers from 
receiving a legaoy for the benefit of a religious organization.ll Artiole 
130 reads: 
The Federal authorities shall have 
power to exercise in matters of religious 
worship and outward ecolesiastioal forms 
such intervention as by law authorized. ~l 
other offioials shall aot as auxiliaries to 
the Federal authorities •••• 
The law recognizes no juridicial per-
sonality in the religious institutions known 
as ohurohes. 
Only a Mexioan by birth may be a minister 
of any religious oreed in Mexioo. 
No ministers of religious creeds shall, 
either in publio or private meetings, or in 
aots of worship or religious propaganda, 
criticise the fundamental laws of the oountry, 
the authorities in particular or the Govern-
ment in general; they shall have no vote, nor 
be eligible to office, nor shall they be 
entitled to assemble for political purposes ••• 
Ministers of religious oreeds are incap-
able legally of inheriting by will from minis-
ters of the same religious oreed or from any 
private individual to whom they are not related 
by blood within the fourth deoree. l2 
Artiole 5 further states that the law does not permit the establishment of 
monastio orders of whatever denomination or for whatever purpose oontem-
plated. This artiole, Kelley comments, was inoorporated to strike at reli-
gious organizations other than Catholio.13 The domination of the state 
over the church was complete under Article 37 in which ohurohes are deprived 
11 Kelley, 262-266. 
12 Branoh, 103-106. 
13 Kelley, 262. 
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of proteotion beoause they oannot appeal to oongress or to the oourts to 
enforoe property rights. If ohuroh authorities merely petitioned against 
oonfisoation, they lost their oitizenshiP;14 sinoe Article 37 provides that: 
Citizenship shall be lost; 
••• 
III By compromising themselves in anyway 
before ministers of any religious creed or 
before any other person not to observe the 
present constitution, or the laws arising 
thereunder. l5 
In regard to the presiden~ of Mexico, in Article 82 he is forbidden to belong 
to any eoolesiastioal state, "The President of the Republic shall have the 
following qua1ifications: ••• 5e shall not belong to the eco1esiastical state 
nor be a minister of any religious creed ••• n16 Finally, Artiole 24 states 
that "Everyone is free to embrace the religion of his choice and to practice 
all ceremonies, devotions, or observances of his respeotive creed, either in 
plaoes of publio worship or at home, provided they do not constitute an 
offence punishable by law". But to make sure that actually no one will be 
this free. Article 130 provides that as the law is now enforced, family 
prayer at home would oonstitute an illegal religious act.17 
Francis Kelley plaoes more of the blame for religious perseoution on 
I Obregon and Calles than upon Carranza. He said that Carranza was "between 
---------------
14 ~., 262-263. 
15 Branoh, 31-32. 
16 Ibid., 63-64. 
17 Branoh, 15 for Article 24, 103-106 for Article 130. Article 130 has 
been quoted on pages 42 and 43 of this chapter. ! I 
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two tires." I Obregon had deserted him and made an agreement with the radi-
oals who wanted nothing less than oomplete destruotion of the ohurch. On 
the other hand, Carranza had made certain pledges to Wilson. On December 23, 
1918, he went before the Me%ican Congress to ask for a modification of 
Article 130 of the Constitution: 
Without flinohing I have oome before the 
Congress suggesting amendments to our Supreme 
Law. In doing this I have no motive other 
than a sinoere desire to restore harmony 
between the word ot the law and the uni ver- . 
sally aooepted prinoiples ot common justice. 
In suggesting that you enact into law the 
bill I herewith submit, I cherish the hope 
the Congress will understand that my motive 
today is that which it has always been, 
namely, to give more weighty consideration 
to the welfare of the people as a whole than 
to the demands 0 f any group no matter how 
honorable it may claim to be. 
The bill I now enclose would amend 
Article 130 of the Constitution adopted 
at Quer~taro, to insure respect for liberty 
of conscience that has been so highly es-
teemed in Mexico as an inalienable human 
right, removing provisions which abridge 
that liberty to a degree not consistent 
with correct morality and not in the public 
interest, which provisions moreover are not 
in harmony with the postulates of modern 
civilization, are a denial ot true liberty 
and violate the statute itself under whioh 
the political organism of our country funo-
tions •••• Those who adopted the constitu-
tion of 1857, had no hesitation in admitting 
that in Mexico there should be liberty of 
worship and liberty of conscience. It they 
did not embody it in the constitution it was 
through an excessive devotion to the com-
plete separation of Church and State by 
whioh they denied their own jurisdiction 
~-~--------------~ 
in any religious matter. The legislators 
of that day were so scrupulous in this 
matter that they refrained from even the 
mention of religion. This was due doubt-
less to the faot that the delegates to the 
1857 Constitutional Convention had entered 
into an agreement not to introduce any 
provision that would place any restriction 
whatever on the liberty of conscienoe whioh 
itself is guaranteed by the oonstitution 
they adopted •••• Not before the promulgation 
of the 1857 Constitution did civil adminis-
tration in Mexico take on a purely seoular 
character. Confusing the law of the 
ohurch with the law of the state a mystical 
character was given to government, and it 
would have been altogether natural for 
the legislature to regulate matters of 
worship. Nevertheless legislatures scrup-
ulously abstained from doing so •••• The 
abridgment of the liberty of the ?uman 
conscience as is done in the Queretaro 
Constitution has no antecedent in our 
national legislation, no precedent even 
analogous is to be found for this provi-
sion whioh I ask you to amend. I have 
searched our national record in vain, I 
have examined every effort made to curb 
the alleged abuses of religion, I have 
found nowhere anything that even had the 
faintest appearanoe of a mandate from the 
nation for any law that interferes with 
worship. Even in the Reform Laws, enacted 
at a time when laicism was firmly in the 
saddle, there is no clause which interferes 
with the details of worship •••• I hold 
that, even if we take nothing else into 
consideration, the very fact that in our 
civil law there is no basis for any act 
that would prescribe or regulate the internal 
affairs of any religion without violating 
the principle of non-intervention which is 
traditional in Mexico, you oannot fail to 
see the justice of the reoommendation I 
make that Article 130 be amended.18 
18 Kelley, 241-244. 
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The Mexican Congress refused to act upon his December 23rd recommendation. 
Mexico City became a scene of intrigue and revolt for the next two years. 
The section of the constitution which involved Mexico in international 
complications is concerned with the nationalization of the country's 
natural resources as expressed in Article 27. This article vested in the 
Mexican nation the ownership of all mineral and oil resources and asserts 
that direct domination by the nation over these subsoil products was 
19 
oooassioned for the good of society. 
----_-.----- .. ---
Article 21: 
The ownership of lands and waters 
comprised within the limits of the national 
territory is vested originally in the Nation, 
which has had, end has, the right to transmit 
title thereof to private persons, thereby 
constituting private property •••• 
The Nation shall have at all times the 
right to impose on private property such limi-
tations as the public interest may demand as 
well as the right to regulate the development 
of national resources, which are susceptible 
of appropriation, in order to conserve them and 
equitably to distribute the public wealth. 
For this purpose necessary measures shall be 
taken to divide large landed estates; to 
develop small landed holdings; ••• Wherefore, 
all grants of lands made up to the present 
time under the decree of January 6, 1915, 
are confirmed. 
Private property acquired for the 
said purposes shall be considered as taken 
for public utility. 
In the Nation is vested direct owner-
ship of all minerals or substances which in 
veins, layers, masses, or beds constitute 
19 Priestley, 437. 
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deposits whose nature is different from the 
components of the land. such as minerals fram 
which metals and metaloids used for industrial 
purposes are extracted; beds of precious stones, 
rock salt and salt lakes formed directly by 
marine waters, ••• phosphates which may be used 
for fertilizers; solid mineral fuels; petroleum 
and all hydrocarbons - solid. liquid or gaseous ••• 
Legal capacity to acquire ownership of 
lands and waters of the nation shall be governed 
by the follOwing provisionsl 
I. Only Mexicans by birth or naturalization 
and Mexican companies have the right to acquire 
ownership in lands ... ters and their appurten- . 
ances, or to obtain concessions to develop mines. 
waters, or mineral fuels in the Republic of 
Mexico ••• 
II. The religious institutions known as 
churches, irrespective of creed, shall in nc 
case have legal capacity to acquire, hold or 
administer real property or loans made on suoh 
real propert,y; ••• Places or public worship are 
the propert,y of the Bation, ••• Episcopal resi-
denoes, rectories. seminaries, orphan a.,ylums 
or collegiate establishments of religious insti-
tutions ••• a~ other buildings built or designed 
tor the administration. propaganda. or teaching 
of the tenets of a~ religious creed shall forth-
with vest. as of full right. directly in the 
Bation ••• 
All contraots and concessions made by tor-
mer governments from and after the year 1816 
which shall have resulted in the monopoly of 
lands, waters and natural resources ot the 
Bation by a single individual or corporation, 
are declared subject to revision, and the Execu-
tive is authorized to decl~re those null ~nd 
void which seriously prejudice the public 
interest.20 
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Disregarding Article 14 of the a.me constitution which forbade retro-
active laws, Article 21 gave retroactive power which affected lands that 
~---------.-.-. 
20 Branch. 15-25. 
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.ere acquired before adoption of the new oonstitution on the theory that 
the nation never had the right to alienate subsoil produots. It was oon-
tended by the present government in Mexioo that nlaz violated Artiole 72 of 
the Constitution ot 1857 when he legislated in favor ot alienation of the 
21 
subsoil produots. Gibbons states that under the laws of 1857, solid min-
eral ruels; petroleum, and all hydrooarbons (solid, liquid, gaseous) 
belonged to the owners of the lands in which they existed.22 Constantine 
brings forth an important point regarding the nationalization ot subsoil 
produots: 
Of course, any nation may, it it thillks 
wise, legally - whether justly or not is 
another question - nationalize its land pro-
vided it compensates foreign owners under 
international agreements satisfaotory to the 
owners and the nations to which they owe 
allegianoe and trom whioh they are entitled 
to protection. This however, does not seem 
to be contemplated in the Carranza document. 2S 
Petroleum oonditions remained a probles all during Carranza's reign. For-
eign interest wanted Article 27 amended to protect their rights. To put 
Article 27 into ettect, Carranza issued decrees stating that all those who 
olaim to be owners ot petroleum lands must file statements of the lands 
they olaim and pay rentals and royalties to the government in order to be 
-.._ .... -_ .. _.-_ .. 
21 Priestley, 438. 
22 Gibbons, 59. 
23 ~exicofs Constitution," !!! Outlook, Karch 14, 1917, 453. 
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allowed to continue in their operation.24 Petroleum companies organized 
themselves and refused to comply with Carranza's decrees. In 1920, Carranza 
made oonoeasions to oil men to the point of allOWing them to resume drilling. 
This was done without prejudioe to either side in the legal controversy. 
Before a conolusion was reached, Carranza was driven from power.25 
E. D. Trowbridge, formerly General Manager of the Mexican Light and 
Power Company in Mexico City commented that the Constitution was strongly 
anti-oapitalistic. This aroused the hostility of the capitalistic class. 
Consequently, the chances tor securing money necessary for reoonstruction 
was diminished. The assembly that adopted the oonstitution was an extremely 
radioal one. 26 The reforms were so drastio, they deteated their awn ends. 
The reason for the non-fullfilment of the promises made by the Carranza 
government was the military situation whioh treated banditry and rebellion 
as an opportunity for self-enriohment; and also the chaotic oonditions of 
the internal attairs. The constitution was too idealistic tor practioal 
use. Instead of trying to better conditions in affairs which menaced the 
life of the people; it undertook to revolutionize the government on a 
"socialistio theory while a corrupt military oligarchy and a none too honest 
set ot civilian ofticers vitiated whatever was good in the new plan by the 
27 
most oynical grafting." The condition was not nsw with Carranza, and will 
---------------
24 Frederio R. Kellogg, "The Mexican Oil Situation", Mexico and the Cari-
bbean, 60. --- - --
25 Priestley, 60. 
26 E. D. Trowbridge, "Reoonstruotion Problems in Mexioo," )(exico ~~ 
Caribbean, 110. 
27 Priestley, 443. 
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not disappear suddenly under one goverDment. It was believed that the tirst 
step in the development ot the Mexioan people toward selt-government would 
come through a peaoeful and stable method ot transmitting the presidenta1 
otfice. But Carranza wished to retire only in place ot a man who would oon-
I 
tinue his program. Be made a tatal mistake when he quarreled with Obregon 
who at this time was the most prominent man in the party and stronger mili-
tarily than the president. Suooessors to Carranza waged their oampaigns tor 
a year and a halt. This oondition contributed to more unrest and disorder. 
I In January, 1920, Obregon lead in the raoe, he was a popular idol and the 
only man ever to deteat Villa.28 Other men in the oampaign were Ambassador 
Ignaoio Bonillas, who returned to Mexioo trom the United States to quioken 
I his oandidaoy; General Pablo Gonzalez, who surrendered his military oommand 
in the south to begin his tormal oampaign; and Adolto de la Huerta, governor 
ot the state ot Agua Prieta in Sonora. Carranza's government was planning 
to leave Mexioo City tor Vera Cruz. The remaining generals still loyal to 
Carranza advised him to resign not later than May 15th. Priestley in his 
account ot the exodus shows that Carranza was not only making his escape 
with the goverDment records but also the funds: 
----_ ... _-----.. --
Twenty-one trains, oollected and equipped 
at great eifort, were to oarry away 20,000 
troops, oarloads ot reoords, and millions 
ot treasure. The dispatohes said 27,000,000 
pesos were taken, but, atter the disaster, 
Pastor Rouaix, ex-seoretary ot Agrioulture, 
upon returning to )(exioo on )laY 18 with the 
booty, said that it was worth 100,000,000 
pesos.29 
28 ~., 442-444. 
29 ~., 444-449. 
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Along with the troops went the employees of the State~ the Cabinet, and the 
Supreme Court. Attaoks were made upon the oonvoy from the outset. Trains 
were out off, traoks torn up, and railroad «mployees killed or wounded. 
Finally~ esoape by rail was given up and Carranza set out for the Puebla 
Mountains. He was unsucoessful for on )(ay 18th he met his death while 
asleep in a mountain shaok at Tlaxcalantongo~ in the State of puebla.30 
Kelly, in his account of Carranza's death states that in the attack made 
upon Carranza's hut, he believes that someone of Carranza's own party MUst 
have been responsible for there were three others sleeping in the hut and 
only Carranza was killed.3l 
On May 2 5th~ Adolfo de la Huerta was chosen substitute president by 
the reorganized Congress to serve to the end of Carranza's term, November 20, 
1920. I In 1921~ Obregon became head of the Mexican Government. He was not 
recognized by the United States beoause of the offensive Article 27 of the 
Constitution of 1917. I In 1923, Obregon agreed to validate subsoil and min-
era! rights obtained prior to 1917 and the United States resumed diplomatic 
relations.32 
---_ .. --_ .. _-----
30 Ibid.~ 450. 
-
31 KelleY'~ 244. 
32 Thomas A. BaileY', A Diplomatic Historl of the American People, F. S. 
Crofts & Co., New York~ 1944, n3. - -
CHAPTER IV 
INTERPRETATIONS OF WILSON'S MEXICAN POLICY 
Generally speaking, Wilson's foreign policy was fundamentally the beliet 
in man himself and faith in demooraoy. Upon the soundness ot the demooratio 
prinoiple he based all his other beliets. He believed that all nations 
should regard every other nation as its equal. If disputes should develop 
between nations, the only proper way to settlement was by arbitration. This 
was examplied by his immediate acceptanoe of mediation from Latin Amerioa in 
disputes with Mexioo. Ultimately, he believed that foroe should never be 
used by nations to settle disputes but should be used only to resist aggres-
sion. Wilson, however, had diffioulty oarrying out his polioy. There was 
the oonstitution and laws of his own oountry, its treaties, and the obliga-
tiona inourred by previous administrations, and rules of international law. 
Another element which oonditioned the direction of foreign affairs was the 
pressure brought to bear by publio opinion. Beoause of his faith in dam-
ocracy, he wished to fulfill the desires of the peoplee Therefore, his 
speeches and messages were directed toward informing and moulding public 
opinion. Wilson was sincere about the principles he expounded. Robinson 
states that others have held to the same prinoiples as did Wilson but few had 
the courage to apply them in foreign relations. His firm belief in demo-
oratia principles led him to submit his foreign policy to the test of public 
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opinion. He believed the public should be intormed and they should be 
allowed to discuss the issue among themselves. This belief in democracy 
was responsible for his plan to leave the Mexican people to work out their 
own problems. He refused to allow the United States to assume responsibili-
ties toward its own citizens insofar as it would carry the risk of inter-
fering with the political life of other people. Other people of other 
nations were better off without the help ot the United States it such aid 
meant JIOrtgage of their :t\tture independence. He undyingly adhered to the 
supremacy ot law. He insisted that constitutional methods be tollowed when 
administrations were changed in the Latin American countries. He could not 
oondone with reoognition Huerta's elevation to the presidency because it 
1 
was, Wilson thought, obtained by such trickery. 
There were three elements that were dominant in Wilson's foreign policy. 
First, he believed that nations as well as individualS should contorm to 
the JIOral laws. Nations are obliged to be just, to curb exploitation among 
nations as individuals are obliged to do within nations. Seoondly, he 
believed the people ot various countries had the right to and were also 
oapable,it permitted, of ruling themselves. Liberty was second only to 
justice. He always tavored selt-government. He showed the distinction 
bet.een selt-government and democraoy. Democracy, he regarded as the tinal 
development ot maturity in selt-government, the full expression ot selt-
government. The bases ot both were the same, a developed sense ot law, 
.. _------.. -..... -.... 
1 Robinson and West, 150-154. 
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a political consoiousness. experience in obeying the law and the dictates of 
morality. rhe third great element of Wilson's foreign policy was his con-
oeption of the Un! ted States and its mission. Wilson believed that our 
real purpose as a nation was to set up a goverDm8nt by the people and to 
demonstrate by example the principle of right. Our duty was to be a model 
of democracy, to give examples of righteousness to the world, and work for 
the rights of men and their happiness. He also believed that promoting 
America's material prospertywas important to show ourselves sincere in 
carrying out our mission. rhe material interest in our foreign policy was 
to be subordinated to the higher interests of national dignity, honor, and 
duty. Here again, there were factors which made the mission difficult. 
One important one was the pressure put on goveruments to uphold American 
property rights, wherever they were justified, within this limit, that the 
government would not be committed to support special interest or to use 
force. Dollar diplomacy was repudiated. Wilson was oonvinoed that the 
world was beooming inter-dependent. Isolationism was a milestone passed 
after the Spanish-American War. Peace would result if nations would realiZe 
their moral responsibilities, aocept all nations as equals, do away with 
exploitation, and faithtully keep all treaty pledges.2 ~l in all, Wilson 
oonsidered himself at onoe a reformer of and a orusader for democratic 
ideals as far as the ~atin Americans were concerned. He was, according to 
many opponents of his policy, still the schoolmaster trying to teaoh the 
little nations of the Americas how to behave. 
---------------
2 Botter, 651-654. 
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Tumulty, Wilson's Secretary, in his writings about the president, said 
that in his inauguration address in March ot 1913 he stated that legitimate 
property claims would be respected, but that those who believed that the 
ohief business of this government is tc promote their private or oorporate 
interests were due tor a disappointment. The president expressed more 
interest in the masses than in the speoial groups. Resisting the urgings 
of American industrial interests in Mexioo was a great problem to the presi-
dent. ~hose who wanted intervention were those with large land and indus-
trial holdings there. To them, intervention in Mexioo was a polioy of 
enriohment. Wilson reoeived bitter oriticism as a result of this -Watoh-
ful waiting" policy. He was disheartened by the taot that most of the 
criticism came trom his own cabinet otficers - they believed it too ideal-
istic. The heart ot his polioywas expressed by him when he said, "I am 
more interested in the fortunes ot oppressed men, women, and children than 
in any property rights whatever.... So long as the pawer of reoognition 
rests with me the Government of the United States will refuse to extend the 
hand of welcome to anyone who obtains power in a sister republio by treach-
ery and violence •••• • 3 Wilson vindicates his policy of -Watohful waiting" 
when he said to Tumult,. in June of 1916: 
----- ... _--------
••• were I considering the matter trom 
the standpoint of my own political 
fortunes, and its influence upon the 
result of the next election, I should 
at once grasp this opportunity and 
3 Tumulty, 142-149. 
---.-_ ... _-------
inTade Mexico for it would mean the 
triumph of my administration. But this 
has never been in my thoughts for a 
siDgle moment. The thing that daunts 
me and holds me back is the aftermath 
of war, with all its tears and tragedies 
••• I will not resort to war against 
Mexico until I have exhausted eTery means 
to keep out of this mess ••• Time, the 
great solvent, will, I am sure, vindioate 
this policy of humanity and forbearance. 
Ken forget what is back of this struggle 
in )lexico. It is the age-long struggle 
of a people to come into their own, and 
while we look upon the incidents in the 
foreground, let us not fOrget the tragic 
reality in the background which towers 
above this whole sad picture •••• Tumulty, 
some day the people of America will know 
why I hesitated to intervene in Kexioo. 
I cannot tell them now for we are at 
peaoe with the great power whose poison-
ous propaganda is responsible for the 
present terrible condition of affairs in 
)lexioo. German propagandists are there 
now, fomenting strife and trouble between 
our countries. Germany is anxious to have 
us at war with Mexico so that our minds 
and our energies will be taken off the 
great war across the sea. She wishes an 
uninterrupted opportunity to carryon her 
submarine warfare and believes that war 
with Mexico will keep our hands off her 
and thus give her liberty of action to do 
as she pleases on the high seas. It be-
gina to look as if war with Germany is 
ineTitable. If it should come - I pray 
God it may not - I do not wish America's 
energies and forces divided, for we will 
need eTery ounce of reserTe we have to 
lick Germany. Tumulty, we must try patience 
a little longer and await the deve1opment.4 
4 Ibid., 157-160. 
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Tumu1t7 concludes that the Zimmerman note (Januar,y 19, 1911) proves 
that German intrigue was busy in Mexico. The president spoke again about 
this German infiltration in a Flag Day address, delivered at Washington 
on June 14, 1911: 
They (German7) sought b7 violence to 
destroy our industries and arrest our 
commerce. They tried to inoite »exioo 
to take up arms against us and to draw 
Japan into a hostile alliance with them; 
and that, not b7 indirection, but b7 
direot suggestion froa the Foreign Of-
fioe at Berlin.5 
In view of developments in the ear17 part of 1911 when the German intrigue 
into Mexioo was disoovered, it ma7 be that the oontinuation of Wilson's 
humane and christian po1ic7was forced upon him since the United States 
would have been in a precarious position to deal with Ger.many if a war with 
Mexico had resulted.S 
Houston vindicates "V1ilson's policy toward Mexioo. He said that the 
president saved the United States from the "shameles8 disgrace of a war 
with the downtrodden, hapless, and helpless people of Mexico." In regard 
to the criticism the president received for taking Vera Cruz, he answers 
with a question: "VIhat would the critics bave said if the president bad 
failed to sustain Admiral Mayo?,,1 
Wilson denounced Huerta because Wilson believed that he had assumed 
legislative power violating all constitutional law and thereb7, destroyed 
---... ----------
5 ~., 160. 
S Josephus Daniels, 181. 
1 David Houston, Righi Years with Wilson' 8 Cabinet, 1913-1920, Doubleday, 
.f C New 0 -voT. • 
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all possibilit,y of fair and free elections. Wilson could not bring himself 
to recognize such a president. The president's attitude since the death of 
Madero was the subject of a great deal of discussion all culminating in many 
differences of opinion. Some believed that the president set up an imprac-
tical standard for Mexico and others believed in the doctrine that internal 
changes in a state do not affect its international position; they say that 
he has confused the recognition of new states with the recognition of new 
8 governments. 
One of the major issues which brought on a great deal of discussion 
tor and against Wilson's polioywas the issue involving the sending of Amer-
ican troops into Mexico to pursue Villa. An editorial comment in the 
American Journal !!. International ~ vindioates Wilson's position. In this 
instanoe, the ·sohoolmaster" in Wilson appears more prominently than the 
idealist. The article states that there was no doubt that steps should have 
been taken (as they were) to obtain reparation for the insult to our Ameri-
can sovereignty. It further explains that under ordinary circumstances the 
problem would have been put betore the Mexican Government with a request 
that reparations be made and the bandits be apprehended and punished. Seem-
ingly, sending troops across the trontier into Mexico constituted a viola-
tion of Mexican sovereignt,y just as the invasion of American soil consti-
tuted a violation of American sovereignty. But, the article continues, 
--------------... 
8 "MeXiCO", American Jour. Internat'l. Law, 1913, Vol. 7, 836. An editor-
ial comment. -
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the situation in Mexico 'Was extraordinary, end even though Carranza t s govern-
ment obtained ~ facto recognition, Carranza still 'Was not in control ot all 
of Mexico. At any rate, due to the fact that Carranza had been recognized, 
he should have been called upon as the head of the ~ facto government to 
disavow the outrage. Upon his inability to accomplish this purpose, the 
United States could decide for itself to capture Villa and his satellite. 
Mexico and the United States have dealt 'With this border problem for many 
years. As far baok as 1855, the then Secretary of State, Mr. Marcy in re-
gard to the border problem arbitrarily stated that if Mexican indians are 
permitted to cross the border and harass the country, they may be chased 
back over the border and punished. In like manner, the Mexicans could enter 
the United States to punish indians under the jurisdiction of the United 
States who oross the Mexican border provided they abstain from punishing the 
persons and property of the United States citizens.9 Wilson was willing to 
maintain the same policy to 'Whioh the State Depar'bnent had been previously 
commi tted. Our Secretary of State Lansing oommunicated the follOWing under 
Wilson's instructions 
.. -------_ .. _--.-
The Secretary of State to 
Special Agent Silliman 
Department of State 
Washington, March 13, 1916 
••• The Government ot the United States ••• 
readily grants permission for military 
forces of the de faoto Government of 
9 nThe American Punitive Expedition Into Mexico,· The Am. Jour. ot Inter-
nat'l Law, 1916, Vol. 10, 337-339. .An editoriaic;-omi1lent-,;y-James Brown 
Scott.-
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Mexico to cross the international bound-
ary in pursuit of lawless bands of armed 
men who have entered Mexico from the 
United States, committed outrages on 
Mexican 80il. and fled into the United 
States, on the understanding that the 
de facto Government of Mexico grants 
the reciprocal privilege that the mili-
tary foroes of the United States may 
pursue across the international bound-
ary into Mexican territory lawless bands 
of armed men who have entered the United 
States from Mexico oommitted outrages on 
American soil, and fled into Mexioo.lO 
Lansing 
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As it turned out, Carranza opposed our entry into Mexico and aotua1ly 
helped prevent the capture of Villa.ll The entry of our troops into Mexico 
was resented by the Mexicans, the very people whom Wilson thought he was 
helping. At ¥arral, it was believed that American troops were on the verge 
of capturing Villa but they were attacked by the inhabitants of ¥arra1, so 
they withdrew in order to prevent bloodshed. Carranza denied the existenoe 
of the agreement that he made with the United States under which this coun-
try believed it had the right to send forces into Mexico. In faot no suoh 
agreement existed, as far as his new government was concerned. He said 
that we entered Mexico without his consent and ordered the Amerioan troops 
to withdraw. In acoordance with the recommendations of the commission 
established to adjust this matter, Wilson withdrew the American troops and 
held the ~ faoto government responsible for Amerioan interests in the 
affected territory of Mexico. Thus closed the period of interrupted official 
-------p-------
10 Forei~ Relations, 1916. 488. 
11 See Chapter II of this paper, 28 ~!!i. 
:1 
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intercourse between the United States and Mexico which started with the 
refusal of Wilson to recognize Huerta. Many hold that it would have been 
wise tor Wilson not to have been so idealistically concerned about Mexico, 
and therefore, to have recognized Huerta. These same believed that Huerta 
would have brought peace to Mexico and this would have saved years ot blood-
shed and the United States some expenditure ot money. They also say that 
the tailure to recognize Huerta and the demands made upon him amounted to 
intervention on the part ot the United States. However, George A. Finch in 
his article ~exico and the United States," stands behind the president and 
says there is no basis tor the assumption that Wilson's action toward Mexico 
amounted to intervention. The American policy tollowed the best practices 
ot American traditions.12 But it was obviously not Wilson's ideal policy 
of trust in the people • 
.. __ .. -----------
12 George A. Finch, "Mexioo and the United States," The American Journal 
ot International Law, 1917, Vol. 11, 399-406. 
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CHAPTER V 
VARIOUS OPINIONS BY AMERICAN STATESMEN AND SCHOLARS 
Amerioan statesmen and scholars of the United States foreign relations 
have presented various general estimates of Wilson's policy toward Mexico. 
Among the views of the statesmen there is the statement of Senator Culberson 
printed in the Dallas Morning News, on May 3, 1914, whioh was the result of 
an interview with the senator on the Mexican situation. This information 
was incorporated in the Congressional Record on May 16, 1914. The senator 
advooated the people to support Wilson's Mexioan policy beoause it "refleots 
the best sentiment of the Amerioan people." The president wants to avoid 
war. Aside from the sad results of a war, it would "dishonor us as a 
ohristian nation for engaging in a useless and preventable confliot with a 
comparatively helpless people." The president's plan of giving the people 
of Mexico an opportunity to settle their ovm problems, to refuse to intervene, 
and to decline recognition of HUerta was a wise plan to follow. Of the Tam-
pico inoident, the senator states that it was an aot which could be settled 
short of war, but when suitable reparation was not made the president was. 
"warranted in redressing by reprisals and seizure of ports." The prinoiple 
oomplaint was, however, that Huerta should have been reoognized. To many, 
it was believed that peace would have resulted. But Senator Culberson states 
that would have been extremely doubtful. He oonoludes, that we had a 
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president who went to the root of things and "declared the wholesome and 
goodly doctrine that treachery and assassination would find no refuge here.nl 
At Senator Howard's request, a letter whioh he received from Mr. George 
Robinson Haokley, resident of Mexioo City for many years, was incorporated 
into the Reoord because the senator believed it would show the truth of the 
Mexioan situation to the Amerioan people. The letter was dated August 28, 
1913, and incorporated into the Record June 22, 1914: 
---------------
••• 1 thank God that our president had the 
prinoiple and moral oourage to refuse, in 
spite of the insistent olamor of big business 
interests, many being unscrupulous mercen-
aries, to help foist this false government 
upon an unwilling and resisting people --
did not help to prolong artificial conditions 
brought about by one of the most diabolical 
and revolting crimes in history, but is, on 
the contrary, lending his moral support to 
the oause of the people who are irresistibly 
struggling for liberty. There are thousands 
of intelligent Mexioans who respect and admire 
the attitude of nonrecognition and the high 
moral ground maintained ••• tt • 
1 am certainly proud and delighted that 
Washington has refused to reoognize or put 
its approval on the assassins who have 
usurped the Mexican Government, who, in-
stead of representing the will of the 
people, represent a betrayal of the will of 
the people as expressed in the triumph of 
the Madero revolution and his election to 
the presidency ••• " 
The oonstitutionalists stand on a 
firmer and higher ground than Huerta, as they 
are fighting against usurpation and for 
1 Congo ~., 63 Cong., 2 Sess., Vol. 51, 8153. 
r. __ --------------~ 
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liberty and constitutional government, and 
should, in my opinion, receive from our 
country and Government every sympathy, 
encouragement, and assistance consistent 
with our honor. How can we honorably 
recognize, affiliate with, or assist on 
illegal, unconstitutional Government, 
established by "irregular foroe" and 
violenoe, causing the deaths in the very 
beginning, through on infamous fake battle 
when Mexico City was 11 shot up," of thou-
sands of innocent people, including women 
and ohildren, even babies? To me it is 
unthinkable."2 
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Harper's Weekly printed an article, August 22, 1914, by Charles W. 
Eliot oalled 11 Wilson's Foreign Policies." This was inoluded in the Reoord 
by Honorable J. Thomas Heflin, represenative from .Alabama. Mr. Eliot here 
stated that the prinoiple aohievement of the Democratic party was a sound 
international policy and conduct. Wilson was thoroughly oommitted to no 
forceful intervention. American investors went into Mexico of their own 
free will beoause they thought they could make more money there than at 
home. Revolution in Mexioo would mean great loss to these industrious 
Americans, this oould have been prevented by intervention. Wilson refused 
to intervene. Instead he brought the Amerioans, who would leave, out of 
Mexico. With this policy, America made a great contribution to international 
peaee.3 
The Jaoksonville (Ill.) Courier carried an artiole by former Congress-
man James M. Graham of Springfield entitled, "Graham Defends Wilson's Mexican 
2 Congo Ree., 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 1914, Vol. 51, App. 666-668. 
3 Congo ~., 63 Congo, 2 Sess., 1914, Vol. 51, 869-870. 
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Polioy -- Blames Capitalists For Disturbances In Talk At Franklin Catholic 
Picnic." It was incorporated into the Reoord September 7, 1916. Mr. Graham 
defends Wilson's policy. He said border and international problems that 
have made our relations with Mexico strained for so many years was the fault 
of Amerioan oapitalists who wanted the United States to control Mexioo so 
that their property in Mexioo would inorease in value. Amerioans owned more 
/ 
than forty per cent of land and this had deoreased in value sinoe Diaz's 
r~gime had oollapsed. He praised the president's resistanoe against the 
power of these wealthy groups of oapitalists. Then Mr. Graham reviews the 
I , 
Diaz regime when oapitalists were allowed to enter the oountry with their 
views of exploitation. He says that these influenoes are so powerful they 
own a large part of the wealth of Mexioo as well as a large part of wealth 
in the United States. Consequently, they oontrol the press and thus oan 
exert a power in forming publio opinion. By this method they wish the 
authorities in the United States to oonform to their views. They want our 
government to intervene in Mexioo to protect their property there. The cap-
italist does not care about the rights of man. People of this type put a 
higher value on property rights than rights of man. Mr. Graham states that 
Senator La Follette expressed the view that Amerioan finanoiers have been 
responsible for Amerioan raids on the frontier to awaken the Amerioan public 
who in turn would force Wilson to intervene. In oonclusion, Mr. Graham said, 
"I doubt if the people will ever fully realize the magnificent resistanoe 
whioh President Wilson has made to the efforts put forth by these powerful 
!I,I, 
:1' I" 
" 'I 
67 
combinations of wealth ••• 11 4 
The referenoe to La Follette in the previous paragraph introduces an 
artiole in Senator La Follette's magazine written by him entitled "Who Owns 
Mexico'l" This artiole was incorporated into the Record at the request of 
Honorable Pat Harrison of Mississippi on August 11, 1916. Prooeeding from 
where Mr. Graham left off, La Follette denounoes the ambitions of big monied 
interests. Those who want war with Mexico are those that also own most of 
the United States. They are the oaptains of industry and finance. Their 
profits are so great they want to lower interest rates or else invest in 
foreign countries. They invest in the oountries of Latin Amerioa where 
labor is cheap. But there is one drawbaok, the governments in most of them 
are weak, therefore, revolutions are frequent and property rights unstable. 
But they can make their foreign investments good by inlisting the baoking of 
the United States. They wanted intervention and they tried to influence 
publio opinion in that direction. Intervention meant war. Concluding, 
La Follette said, "In the ovmership of Mexico we find that real menaoe to 
the peace between Mexioo and the United States. American oapitalists are 
desperately attempting to have the flag follow their investments.1I5 
Honorable Claudius A. Stone of Illinois on September 5, 1916, spoke 
before the House of Representatives at which time he gave his opinion of 
Wilson's Mexioan Po1iey. The representative begins, ttpresident Wilson's 
4 Congo Reo., 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 1916, Vol. 53, App. 2139. 
5 Congo Ree., 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 1916, Vol. 53, App. 1730. 
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faith in demooraoy and the unselfishness of the United States in interna-
tionaJ. dealings have beon so strikingly expressed in his Mexioan polioy that II 
" 
it may be said to oonstitute the greatest contribution which the country has 
made in many years to the progressive thought of mankind." The president 
stayed with his Mexioan polioy throughout his administration for two reasons; 
first, his belief that all nations, weak or strong have the inviolable right 
to control their internal problems and secondly, his belief that Mexioo will 
not become peaoeful and law abiding until she has been left to settle her 
own problems without interference fr~ elsewhere. Our relations with Mexioo 
were closely connected with the rest of Latin Amerioa. Before Wilson's 
Administration, Latin America was suspioious of the United States. The Mexi-
oan policy to our neighbors presented a test of our sinoerity and friendship. 
They believe they could expect no better treatment than the United States 
would extend to Mexico. Consequently, besides handling the Mexioan situation 
Wilson was concerned with formulating a cooperative pollcy for Pan-Amerioa. 
It was created not only for trade relations but also for the development of 
an international brotherhood. Wilson's Mexican policy did accomplish this. 
Latin America became more trusting of the United States. Honorable Stone 
states that" in strengthening the bonds of good-will between the Republics 
of this hemisphere Mr. Wilson has rendered a patriotic service of highest 
order." When Wilson was faced with the problem of recognition of Huerta, 
some of his advisers only considered the selfish interests involved, they 
wanted to sacrifice Mexioan liberties to establish order under any circum-
stance and thereby proteot Amerioan property. But fortunately Wilson did 
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not weaken for it was later believed that Huerta was not powerful enough to 
oontrol Mexico. Carranza was recognized by the Latin American oountries and 
the United States because it seemed to them that his forces oontained more 
organization, unity and harmony thus showing the brighter promise for Mexi-
co's salvation. After reoognition, Carranza's oampaign against Villa was 
more sucoessful. Villa foroes disintegrated into small bands and he himself 
degenerated into only a bandit leader. He raided the border to bring about 
Amerioan intervention. Intervention did not result but the situation showed 
the United States that they could not depend on Carranza for help against 
Villa. As a result, Wilson ordered Pershing to capture Villa. Wilson 
informed the Mexicans that the Amerioan expedition into Mexico was solely 
for the purpose of punishing those responsible for the Columbus raid. 
Because of the Columbus raid and a little later the Carrizal affair, pressure 
was brought to bear upon the president to deolare war. This would have been 
a war by a well-armed, great nation against a bankrupt people, tired with 
five years of civil strife. Wilson acted his theory of not exploiting the 
little nations of the world. The president was also concerned about affairs 
in Europe and a better development for Pan-Amerioan understanding. He 
refused to go to war with Mexico. Wilson's policy paved the way for settle-
ment of disputes by a joint commission ornnposed of three Americans and three 
Mexicans. Conoluding, "Thus, the story of the Wilson~exican policy closes 
as it began, a sto~J of peace -- peace. War if neoessary, but not for mere 
misunderstandings; not for lack of patience and oertainly not for 
I 
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eXPloitation."S 
J. Hamilton Lewis, Senator from Illinois, in his remarks in the Senate, '! 
January lS, 1915, justified Wilson's recognition of Carranza. He said, 
Carranza was chosen for recognition because he showed more strength and a 
more advantageous position in Mexioo than the other partisan leaders. It 
was not done merely at the Itoaprice" of the president, without information 
of justification upon the conditions. Then he conoludes: 
••• Will not my eminent opponents be 
just to history and infornl the United 
States of America fairly that it was 
only after consultation with the large 
and princiPal oountries of South America 
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile -- neighbors 
of Mexioo, bound by the same ties, held 
by the same sacred religion, animated by 
the same motives, and inspired by the 
same aspirations, knowing as they must 
have known better than all other souroes 
what was best for their neighbors and 
their blood kin-that it was from these 
that there oame the suggestion, as well 
as the proof, that Carranza was at the 
time the most promising solution of the 
then disturbing problem and that upon 
their request and manifestation of facts 
the recognition was acoorded? Then it 
was that Carranza was recognized."7 
Among the various general estimates of the Amerioan soho1ars of the 
United States foreign relations concerning Wilson's policy toward Carranza, 
there is the views of Latan~ and Wainhouse. In their diplomatio history, 
---------------
6 Congo ~., S4 Cong., 1 sess., 1916, Vol. 53, App. 2069-2074. 
7 Congo ~., 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 1916, Vol. 53, 1062-1068. 
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they indioate that the "handling of the Mexican situation, though denounoed 
at the time as weak and vacillating, was in full aooord with his new Latin-
American policy." They say that it was quite clearly a violation of our 
ancient policy to refuse recognition to Huerta, but they argue that Huerta 
could not olaim the backing of the majority of the Mexioan people. Huerta 
was "a self-constituted dictator.tt Therefore, Wilson was justified in not 
recognizing him. He was justified in reoognizing Carranza beoause the latter 
had the baoking of "three-fourths of the territory of Mexioo." In the first 
instanoe there is question of the majority of people and in the second there 
is question of a majority of~. In neither instance is there any ques-
tion of popular eleotions. Certainly, if the popular will of the people of 
the United States were to be followed, Wilson wuuld have to have gone to 
war against Mexioo, in view of the "loud and persistent demanl in the United 
States for war against Mexioo," after the reoognition of Carranza. Wilson's 
idealism overlooked the faot that scarcely ever in the history of the Latin 
American republics had the will of the people been oonsidered, and he was 
soon to learn that Carranza was not oonoerned about the will of the majority. 
In suomary, Latan' and Wainhouse point to the great moral effeot of Wilson's 
polioy of staying out of a war against Carranza. 8 
President Wilson's refusal to beoome 
involved in war with Mexioo oonvinced the 
world of his sinoerity and gave him a 
hearing during the Great War suoh as no 
8 John H. Latan~ and David W. Wainhouse, A History ~ Amerioan Foreie 
Polio~, The Odyssey Press, New York, 1940, 556-660. 
political leader of any nation ever before 
oommanded. His acoeptanoe of the mediation 
of the ABC Powers and his subsequent oon-
sultation with the leading representatives of 
Latin Amerioa @ave new life and meaning to 
Pan Amerioanism and tended to refute the 
oharges of the Pan Hispanists.9 
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It is very doubtful, if we judge by subsequent events, whether Mexico appre-
ciated this sentiment of respeot for Wilson's sinoerity. 
That President Wilson had pioked the wrong man in Carranza is clear 
from the account of our relations with Mexico as given by Professor Bemis. 
We find such damaging statements as these: 
9 ~., 660. 
The Government of Mexico fell among 
rival armed factions, temporarily to the 
Carranzistas who at all times denied the 
right of foreign powers to mediate in any 
settlement of Mexioan affairs. 
The elimination of Huerta did not 
bring peace to Mexico •••• 
Confusion worse confounded, murder 
and pillage, swept Mexico. Anxious to 
hasten the establishment of order, Presi-
dent Wilson summoned a conference of 
diplomatic representatives of six Latin-
Amerioan powers ••• to advise on which 
warring faction to recognize and support 
as the de facto government of Mexico. 
The-oonference invited representatives 
of the Mexican groups to participate. 
Despite the fact that Carranza refused the 
invitation and consistently denied the 
right of outside parties to give advice 
to Mexico, the oonferees announced their 
decision that the Carranzista party was 
'the only party possessing the essentials 
of recognition •••• ' The United States 
then promptly (October 19, 1915) recog-
nized de facto Carranza's authority •••• 
The de facto recognition of Carranza 
proved premature. lO 
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The instances of our troops activities along the borders under General 
Pershing and the utter inability of Mexican troops to prevent raids, along 
with Carranza's resentment over our troops and interference are then 
reoounted. Then we find that the Mexican Congress, not the Mexican people, 
elected Carranza president. 
Wilson now hastily recognized the new 
government de jure. When Henry p. Fletcher, 
the new Ambassador of the United States, 
entered the Chamber of Deputies, the members 
received him with hisses, in s~eful con-
trast to the applause which greeted the 
German Ambassador, whose proposal to Mexico 
the British secret service and Washington 
government had just ventilated to the world: 
a war alliance, to inolude Japan, for the 
purpose of conquering back from the United 
States 'the lost territory' in the states 
of Texas, New Mexico and Arizona ••• It was 
a spectacular victory for Carranza •••• ll 
The watohful waiting policy if we are to judge by the statistics which 
Professor Bemis presents may have had some ideal behind it, but a casual 
observer would be bound to admit that it had no eye to the protection of 
Amerioans and their interest, since 397 American citizens were killed in 
Mexico and forty to fifty thousand forced to leave with American property 
losses between 170 million and 505 million pesos, according to different 
t " t 12 es :una es. 
10 Bemis, A Diplomatic History.2! ~ United States, 550-551. 
11 Ibid., 553. 
12 Samuel F. Bemis, ~ Latin American Policy of the United States, Har-
court Brace, New York, 1943, 183-84. See Chapters X and XI. 
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Frederick Starr of the University of Chioago, who spent four years in 
Mexico during these troublesome times, wrote his opinions of the situation 
to the year 1914. He writes: 
The latest step in the battle between 
the two presidents has been the lifting of 
the embargo upon arms •••• It is amusing, 
however, and saddening. to find ourselves 
baoking Villa and Carranza at the present. 
The avowed reason for hostility to Huerta 
is his bloody hands. His are olean, oom-
pared with Villa's. 
What is the status at the present time? 
We have impaired a nation's sovereignty, --
a serious matter; we have prolonged a bloody 
oonf1iot, with hideous cruelties and frightful 
loss; we have entrenched a man in power, whose 
natural elimination was desireable and would 
soon have come about; we have produoed ruin 
and disaster by a hysterical cry of exodus; 
we have made it impossible legally to 001-
leot damages by refusing to reoognize a 
de faoto government; we are encouraging and 
abetting flagrant abuse of individual rights 
and property. 
All this we have done, and still are 
doing, with the best intentions in the 
world. 13 
Professor Rippy points out that "Wilson took up the Mexioan problem 
with the vision of a Pan Amerioan and even a world reformer." His policy 
ttwas olearly one of intervention, moral but far-reaching in its consequen-
ces.t' Rippy then describes how the Latin-Amerioan states accepted Wilson's 
leadership, but all of the European nations and Japan recognized Huerta. 
Wilson then brought pressure to bear upon the Europeans, who finally sent a 
13 Frederick starr. Mexico ~~ United States, The Bible House, Chicago, 
1914, 407-408. 
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delegation to Huerta in Deoember~ 19l3~ to say that they would lend no sup-
port to h~. Wilson thus blooked off all possibilities of aid or a loan to 
Huerta. It was all for the good of the Mexioan people~ Wilson said. Rippy 
does not give the obvious oonolusion that this was all a policy of the end 
"t"f" th 14 JUs ~ ~es e means. 
Rippy appears to be anti-imperialist~ and henoe his attaok is on the 
intervention of the United States in the affairs of any nation. He oalls the 
reoognition of Carranza a seoond intervention in Mexioan affairs~ and sug-
gests the inoonsistenoy of following the policy of non-intervention along 
diplomatic lines and intervention by military means. He oites the attaoks 
of the Republioan Senators Albert Fall and Willian E. Borah upon the watoh-
ful waiting polioy and he follows with the opinions of the Representatives 
who made an issue of it. Carranza and Villa oontinued their attitude of 
hate toward the United States until~ the writer states, 
The whole country burst into flame and 
even Wilson himself either lost patienoe 
or feared to remain inaotive. Release of the 
captured troops was demanded in none too diplo-
matic terms. For a moment Carranza refused to 
comply. The peace of the two oountries was 
suspended by a thread. The entire militia of 
the United States was ordered to the border 
and available men for the Governor-Generalship 
of Mexioo were disoussed. But just before the 
breaking point was reaohed ••• Samuel Gompers 
sent a personal telegram to Carranza~ ~ploring 
h~ in the name of humanity to release the 
Amerioan prisoners. A few hours later extras 
14 J. Fred Rippy, The United States and Mexico~ F. S. Crofts & Co.~ New 
York~ 1931, 349-52. 
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announced to the Amerioan PUblio that the 
soldiers in question had been set free.15 
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1f.Qy it was that Wilson later recognized Carranza after this and after the 
events of the years following is still not olear, and Ripp'y admits that he 
oannot pass final judgment upon Wilson's polioy. "So far as improvement in 
Mexioan attitude toward the United States was ooncerned, little had been 
acoomplished ."16 
Professor Bailey in his Chapter XXXVI, "Wilson and the New Diplomacy, 
1913-1917," uses practioa11y the same souroes as those already cited, but 
adds something to the interpretation of Wilson's Mexioan policy. "In all 
diplomatio problems of major importance Wilson acted as his own Secretary of 
State." Latin America seemed the most urgent of the problems, and a week 
after his inauguration Wilson stated his policy in regard to the southern 
republios. "He struok out Dollar Diplomaoy by announoing that the Adminis-
tration was not interested in supporting any' special group of interests'." 
The people applauded, but very soon the dollar had to be revived as far as 
the Caribbean was ooncerned. "President Wilson, like another distinguished 
idealist, Thomas Jefferson, found it diffioult to square his theories with 
stern realities. This was partioularly true of Central Amerioa and the 
Caribbean. 1I Yet, a year later he won the applause of the British and the 
world for his honest stand in the matter of the Panama Tolls.17 
15 Ibid., 354-58. 
16 Ibid., 363-364. 
17 Bailey, 593-602. 
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Then Bailey discusses Wilson's Mexican policy. This he heads "Human 
Rights and Property Rights," and summarizes it as "a sharp clash between 
idealiam and legalism." According to Bailey, Wilson stated:· "I am going 
to teach the South American Republics to elect good men~" Wilson was not 
going to follow the lines of least resistance and recognize Huerta. The 
vast amount of criticism of this interference program is summarized by 
George Harvey, who demanded: "What legal or moral right has a President of 
the United States to say who shall or shall not be President of Mexico." 
Wilson 11 suspected that the British oil interests were backing the 'unspeak-
able Huerta' •••• and therefore pursued a policy of nonrecognition and nonin-
terference (which, under the circumstances, was really interference)." 
Then under the heading of "Wrathful Waiting," Bailey gives an account of the 
savage criticism heaped upon Wilson at home and abroad. The waiting ended, 
and Wilson had no other course apparently but to embark on a war. According 
to Bailey it would seem that the mediation of the ABC powers, unthought 
of by Wilson, really saved the situation.18 
Bailey does not add anything to the already given accounts of the recog-
nition of Carranza. He summarizes the situation in 1917 after ~ jure 
recognition as follows: 
••• Wilson withdrew the troops in February, 
1917. They left behind a snarling Carranza, 
a defiant and unrepentant Villa, and a 
18 ~., 602-607. 
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revolution that had yet to run its course. 
Whatever mAy be said of Wilson's policy 
it is olear that he adhered consistently to 
the ideal of encouraging the Mexioan masses 
to work out their own destiny.19 
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With the entrance of the United States in the first World War, the 
crises of the Mexioan situation receded into the background and remained 
there for two years. Wilson's attentions shifted to the European situation. 
On June 8,. 1918, he made his pronouncement to Congress of his famous Fourteen 
Points. The final German offensive in the west failed, July, 1918. This 
was immediately followed by a series of long-distance exchanges of peace 
views made by different governments. On Ootober 6, 1918, Germany requested 
an armistice whioh was signed November 11, 1918, between the Allied and 
Associate Powers and Germany with t~e Fourteen Points as an agreed peaoe 
bases. Wilson's primary interest, at this time, was to incorporate the 
League of Nations in the peace treaties to be signed with the various coun-
tries. Hls determination took him to Paris as head of the Amerioan del ega-
tion. Bemis oomments "He arrived in Europe as a true friend of mankind, 
closer to the principles of Christian oharity and justice than any statesman 
in history." Nilson made the mistake of not including in the American Peace 
Commission representative from both parties in the Senate who would be res-
ponsible for ratifying the treaties. The Paris Peace Conference opened 
January 12, 1919. When Wilson returned from Paris he was criticized bitterly 
for not discussing the text of the League of Nations directly with the Senate 
-_ ... ----------_ .. 
19 ~., 607. 
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to secure their opinions. But~ in its stead~ he discussed the document in 
public addresses and then informally with the Committee on Foreign Relations 
of the Senate together with the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House. 
He also began a speaking tour of the country to rally the public to his sup-
port. But on September 26, 1919, extremely overworked, he collapsed and 
was never able to recover his health. As Bemis states, "The oause had lost 
its most eloquent champion.1t Wilson never was able to resume governmental 
duties and for months the country was without an executive head. }~anwhile, 
the senate refused to ratify the League of Nations. On February 3, 1924, 
"Wilson died broken and bitterly disappointed.,,20 
20 Bemis~! Diplomatio Histo£l of ~ United States, 624-655. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Primary Sources 
H. W. Branch, Ph.D., liThe Mexican Constitution of 1917 Compared with the 
Constitution of 1857," The Annuals 2! ~ American Ac~demy of Political ~ 
Social Soienoe, Philadelphia, May, supp., 1917. Engl~sh translation of the 
two mentioned constitutions. Congressional Record, 1913-1917. Contains 
messages and speeches of the President and congressmen while Congress was in 
session as well as many other incorporated articles and source material. 
Josephus Daniels, The Life of Woodrow Wilson, 1856-1924, Will H. Johnson, 
Chicago, 1924. Secretary or-the Navy under Wilson. Justifies Wilson's 
foreign policy and the Navy's role in the Mexican conflict. Very favorable 
to ·Wilson. 
Carlo De Fornaro, Carranza and Mexico, Mitchell Kennerley, New York, 1915. 
Gives Carranza's background-.--Bigoted and biased on religious question. 
Contemporary account. 
David Houston, Eight Years With Wilson's Cabinet, 1913-1920, 2 Vols., 
Doubleday, Page and Company, New York, 1926. A member ofWilsont s cabinet 
gives views on problems discussed at cabinet meetings and events with which 
he had direct contact. 
Papers Relating to ~ F'oreign Relation_~ of ~ United States, 1913-1920, 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 1920. Compilation of telegrams, 
messages, proclamations, deolaration, and other important official doouments 
which took place between the United States and other oountries. 
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Lansing 
Papers, 1914-1920, Government Printing Office, Washington, 2 Vols., 1939. 
Documents obtained from the large body of correspondenoe of Robert Lansing, 
former Secretary of State, secured for the files after Lansing's death in 
1928. 
James Brown Scott, ed., President Wilson's Forei~ Policy, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1918. Copies of original messages, addresses, and papers 
of President Wilson. 
80 
r 
b 
.------=:\ , 
81 
Joseph p. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him, Doubleday, Page and Com-
pany, New York, 1921. Wilson's secretary for eleven years. Shows Wilson 
as an advocate of great ideals and a leader of great movements. 
Secondary Sources 
The American Journal of International Law, Baker, Voorhis and Company, New 
York, 1913-1920. A compilation of very informative articles on current 
topics of the day. 
Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History::! ~ American People, F. ~. Crofts 
and Oompany, New York, 1944. An excellent general history of AmerJ.can 
diplomatic history. 
Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic Histo~~~ United States, Henry Holt 
and Company, New York, 1942. One of the best diplomatic histories written. 
Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin America~ Policy: .£!. ~ United States, 
Haroourt Brace, New YOrk, 1943. Exoe1lent historical interpretation. 
Georee H. Blakeslee, ed., Mexico And The Caribbean, G. E. Stechert and Com-
pany, New York, 1920. Compilation of addresses during the Conference upon 
Mexico and the Caribbean, at Clark University from May 20 to 22. 1920. 
Edward I. Bell, The Political Shame of Mexico. McBricge, Nast and Company, 
New York, 1914. Much too heavily weighed with massive detail. General 
trends lost. Stressed the economic question. 
James Morton Callahan, American Foreign Policy: in Mexican Relations, The 
Macmillan Company, New York, 1932. American relations with Mexico and the 
problems of American economio penetration. 
Wilford Hardy Callcott, ~ Caribbean Policy ~ the United States, 1890-1920, 
The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1942. Good general history of the whole 
Caribbean policy. 
Thomas Edward Gibbon, Mexioo Under Carranza, Doubleday, Page and Company, 
New York, 1919. An acoount of how the people of Mexioo lived under Oarran-
za's rule. Informative. 
Ernest Gruening, Mexico And ~ Herita~e, The Century Company, New York, 
1928. Expounds views that the Mexican problems are found in the past. 
Extremely comprehensive account of the history of Mexico. Well documented. 
Objeotive. 
82 
Charles Wilson Hackett. The Mexican Revolution and the United States_ 1910-
1926, World Peace Foundation_ Boston. 1910. Go"'Od"" general history. Not 
overly detailed. 
Franois Clement Kelley. Blood-Drenched Altars, The Bruce Publishing Company, 
Milwaukee. 1935. A history of religious persecution in Mexico. 
I Jom H. Latane and David VI. lIJainhouse_ A Ristor:;[ of American F'oreign Policy, 
The Odyssey Press. Nevi York_ 1940. Foremost scholars in the field. 
Stuart Alexander Maoe ork1e. Ph.D •• "American Policy towards Mexico _ It The 
Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science_ The 
Johns Hopkins Press_ Ba1timore_ 1933. Disousses American policy of de fecto 
and de Jure recognition. Author made use of great deal of printed d!Plo-
matie-documents -- Foreign Relation, Congressional Record, and correspondence 
of American ministers in Mexico and United States Secretaries of State to 
1906. 
Harley Notter, .!!':! Origins ~ the Foreign POlicy of Woodrow Wilson, The Johns 
Hopkins Press_ Baltimore, 1937. Excellent comprehensive histor~y of Wilson's 
foreign policy. 
Herbert Ingram Priestley, Ph.D., The Mexican Nation, A History, Maomillan 
Company, New York, 1930. An exoellint history of the-political, eoonomic, 
and sooial development of Mexioo oombined with international affairs. 
J. Fred Rippy, The United States and Mexico_ F. S. Crofts and company, New 
York, 1931. One of the most eminent historians on Mexioan history. 
J. Fred Rippy, Jose Vasconcelos, Guy Stevens, Mexico, The University of 
Chicago, Chicago_ 1928. A series of small volumes on American foreign policy 
in the different countries. Disoussion on Mexico was the first of the 
series. 
Edgar E. Robinson and Victor J. West, ~ Foreigp. Policl ~ Woodrow Wilson, 
1913-1917, Maomillan Company, New York, 1917. Excellent aocount of the 
development of the policy followed by Wilson in dealings with foreign rela-
tions of United States from 1913-1917. Inoludes copies of original official 
documents. 
Frederick Starr, Mexico and the United States, The Bible House, Chicago, 
1914. Not a history, but an interesting account by an observer of many of 
the incidents which occurred in Mexico from 1910 to 1914. 
83 
Ines L. Thomas, "Wilson and Huerta," Thesis submitted for ri.aster's degree. 
Loyola University, Graduate School, 1946. Discusses problems of ~ facto 
and de Jure recognition oombined with Wilson's relations with Huerta. 
--
The Nation, 1915. 
The Outlook, 1917. 
-
,... 
APPP07AL STrEET 
'1: P.rts~ 
